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CONGRESS RESPONDS TO SEDIMA: IS THERE A
CONTRACT OUT ON CIVIL RICO?
I. INTRODUCTION
In September, 1985, in the Boston trial of reputed crime boss Gen-
naro J. Anguilo, the prosecution introduced a tape recording of a tele-
phone conversation between Anguilo and a lieutenant in his
organization, a Mr. Zannino. The two men discussed their understand-
ing that, under federal court decisions, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)' applied only to the racketeering ac-
tivity of a legitimate business, and not an illegitimate one:
Anguilo: Our argument is we're illegitimate business.
Zannino: We're a shylock.
A: We are a bookmaker. We're selling marijuana. We are
illegal here, illegal there. Arsonists. We are everything.
Z: Pimps.
A: So what?
Z: Prostitutes.
A: The law does not cover us, is that right?
Z: That is the argument.
A: I wouldn't be in a legitimate business for all the money in
the world!2
Of course, Mr. Anguilo is no more exempt from the provisions of
the anti-racketeering statute than he would be if he were in a legitimte
business.3 But the problem as many see it, at least with respect to the
private civil action authorized by RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c),4 is
that it is used almost exclusively against "the legitimate businesses it was
intended to protect."5 Instead of a weapon against "racketeering," as
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), 1963, 1964(b) (West Supp.
1985).
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, § 1, at 26, col. 1.
3. Had Mr. Anguilo read United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), he would have
known that RICO applies "to both illegitimate and legitimate enterprises." Id. at 585.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984). For complete text, see infra Appendix A.
5. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of David Albenda, on behalf of
American Council of Life Insurance) (official government printing not yet available; cited from
text of prepared statement, at 1). In 1969, Senator Roman L. Hruska, co-sponsor of S. 1623,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969) (predecessor to S. 30, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 575-85 (1970)), Title IX of which became RICO, said that:
[S. 1623] also creates civil remedies for the honest businessman who has been dam-
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that term is generally understood, RICO's treble damage remedy,6 it is
said, has been used as a means to extort unwarranted settlements in cases
of "garden variety fraud" and "ordinary commercial disputes."7
The Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,8
afforded no relief. Adopting a literal reading of RICO, the Court en-
dorsed the expansive application of RICO that gave rise to the current
controversy. In essence, the Court returned the statute for "correction"
to Congress, where the trouble originated.9
Now Congress is taking a second look at RICO. This Comment,
after briefly reviewing the civil RICO controversy, will examine the ma-
jor proposals that Congress is now considering. Part II sets forth the
portions of the statute that are relevant to the private civil remedy. Part
III shows how the remedy has been used and reviews judicial interpreta-
tion of the statute through the Sedima decision. Part IV identifies the
principal arguments for limiting the scope of section 1964(c), primarily
as they have been presented to Congress in recent Senate and House
hearings and the response to those arguments. Part V sets forth the three
congressional bills that have been introduced on the subject and discusses
the principal issues that have emerged from the congressional hearings
on the bills. In conclusion, Part VI reiterates this Comment's agreement
with those commentators who believe that section 1964(c) should be pre-
aged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman. Despite the willingness
of the courts to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to organized crime activities, as a
practical matter the legitimate businessman does not have adequate civil remedies
available under the Act. This bill fills that gap.
115 CONG. REc. § 6993 (1969). Senator Hruska appeared before the 99th Congress in 1985 to
testify that:
[S]peaking for myself, it was not my intention that the civil sanctions contained in
Title IX serve as a vehicle to engage in the type and extent of use to which many
efforts are directed. My bills, and their successors, were directed at organized crime.
They were not intended to be a vehicle to charge legitimate businessmen with organ-
ized crime activities.
Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 20, 1985) (statement of former Sen. Roman L. Hruska) (official
government printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 8). See also
Justice Marshall's combined dissent in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3292 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 and American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3291). "To allow punitive actions and significant
damages for injury beyond that which the statute was intended to target is to achieve nothing
the statute sought to achieve, and ironically to injure many of those lawful businesses that the
statute sought to protect." Id. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For further discussion of the disagreement on Congress' intent for the scope of RICO, see
infra note 20.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see infra Appendix A for full text of § 1964(a).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92.
8. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
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served with, at most, minor modifications, directed particularly at clari-
fying the definition of "pattern" and limiting vicarious liability for treble
damages.
II. THE PRIVATE CIVIL REMEDY: SECTION 1964(c)
RICO encompasses 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 and includes both crim-
inal and civil provisions. 10 Section 1964(c) provides the treble damages
and attorneys' fees in federal court for "any person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of section 1962."' 1 Section 1962
prohibits "any person" from conducting or acquiring an interest in an
"enterprise"' 2 engaged in interstate commerce through "a pattern of
racketeering activity" or collection of an unlawful debt, from using funds
obtained through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an
unlawful debt to acquire such an interest, or from conspiring to engage in
the prohibited conduct.13 Section 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity"
as any "chargeable" or "indictable" act enumerated in a list of violations
of state and federal law, including-the most controversial-mail fraud,
wire fraud and fraud in the sale of securities. 4 A "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" requires the commission of at least two such acts within ten
years.' 5 Judge Posner noted that, "[t]he statute is constructed on the
model of a treasure hunt."'
6
RICO was originally conceived as a weapon against infiltration of
organized crime into the legitimate business community. 7 One of
RICO's sponsors described section 1964(c) as "a major new tool in extir-
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), 1963, 1964(b) (West Supp.
1985). Section 1963 provides for criminal penalties including imprisonment, fines and forfei-
ture of property. Section 1964 provides the civil remedies. Injunctions are provided for in
§ 1964(a), but the general view is that they are made available only to the federal government.
See ABA SECTION OF CORP., BANKING AND BusiN'ss LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL
RICO TASK FORCE 321-42 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ABA TASK FORCE REPORT]. For the
text of provisions relevant to the private civil remedy provided by § 1964(c), see infra Appen-
dix A.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); for complete text, see infra Appendix A. Id.
12. For text of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) & (4) (1982), definitions of "person" and "enterprise,"
see infra Appendix A.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); for complete text, see infra Appendix A.
14. 18 U.S.C.A. 1961(1) (West Supp. 1985). For complete text, see infra Appendix A.
For texts of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982) (wire fraud) and
a discussion of the controversy surrounding these frauds as predicate offenses, see infra note
258 and accompanying text.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982); for complete text, see infra Appendix A. For a discussion
of the "pattern" requirement, see infra notes 219-57 and accompanying text.
16. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. See supra note 5.
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pating the baneful influence of organized crime in our economic life." 18
In addition to providing innocent victims of racketeers a valuable rem-
edy, a chief feature of the provision is what has become known as its
"private attorney general" effect, whereby the prospect of treble damages
and attorneys' fees would encourage victims to invoke the statute, deter-
ring the proscribed conduct by at once making that conduct unprofitable
and rendering its consequences more certain. 19
III. THE GATHERING STORM
A. How Section 1964(c) Has Been Used
Subsequent uncertainties concerning RICO's scope derive in part
from the fact that, while all the statements of the enacting Ninety-first
Congress suggested that the statute is directed against organized crime,
organized crime is nowhere mentioned in the statute. Rather, Congress
chose to define RICO's objectives in terms of conduct designated as
"racketeering activity."20 But the meaning given that term by the statute
18. 116 CONG. Rc. 25,190 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
19. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3284 (1985) ("Private attorney
general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps.").
20. RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA),
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), 1963, 1964(b) (West Supp. 1985)), as Congress' response
to the growing influence of organized crime disclosed 19 years earlier by the Special Commit-
tee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Committee).
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context. Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 NOTaE
DAME L. REv. 237, 249 (1982). The announced purpose of the Act was "to seek the eradica-
tion of organized crime in the United States." Organized Crime Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 992, 923 (Statement of Findings and Purposes). Title IX was specifically
directed at "the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business." S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
On the question of why Congress wrote the statute without reference to organized crime,
some commentators have focused on Congress' wish to avoid possible constitutional problems
attendant upon creating a crime of status, as distinguished from a crime of conduct. See ABA
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 90-91, citing remarks of Representative Poff, the bill's
primary supporter in the House of Representatives: "'S. 30 is objectionable on civil liberties
grounds, it is suggested, because its provisions have an incidental reach beyond organized
crime.... Have they forgotten that the Constituition applies to those engaged in organized
crime just as it applies to those engaged in white-collar or street crime?'" Id. at 91 n.l 14
(quoting 116 CONG. REc. 18,913-14 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
Professor G. Robert Blakey, who was Chief Counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures when the OCCA was processed, insists that "Congress fully
intended, after specific debate, to have RICO apply beyond any limiting concept like 'organ-
ized crime' or 'racketeering.'" Blakey, supra, at 280 (emphasis in original). See also the re-
marks of the other co-sponsor of S. 30, Senator McClellan:
[Tihe curious objection has been raised to S. 30 as a whole, and to several of its
provisions in particular, that they are not somehow limited to organized crime itself
... as if organized crime were a precise and operative legal concept, like murder,
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does not confine itself to Congress' stated objectives. Since RICO was
enacted in 1970, virtually all the private civil RICO litigation under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c)21 has involved defendants with no known connection to
organized crime, yet pulled within the scope of the statute by allegations
of fraud in their business transactions.
A Department of Justice survey of 230 cases brought under section
1964(c) reveals that only about seven percent of those actions involved
organized crime or allegations of violent offenses or other offenses nor-
mally associated with organized crime, such as organized theft, bribery
and public corruption. 22 About two-thirds of these cases were predicated
rape, or robbery. Actually, of course, it is a functional concept like white collar
crime, serving simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying
group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances. The danger posed by
organized crime-type offenses to our society has, of course, provided the occasion for
examination of the working of our system of criminal justice. But should it follow
S.. that any proposals for action stemming from that examination be limited to
organized crime?
116 CONG. Rrc. 18,913 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan). For a thorough review of
RICO's legislative history, see Blakey, supra, at 249-80.
Organized crime may not be as impossible of definition as represented in early RICO
debates. A definition of "criminal syndicate" appears in H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (available on United States Depository microfiche); see infra note 152 for complete text
of H.R. 2517. H.R. 2517 would add a provision to RICO making it unlawful to "participate in
a supervisory capacity in a criminal syndicate." H.R. 2517, § 2(1)(a).
Several state statutes modeled on RICO already have similar provisions. See ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(C)(2) ("criminal syndicate" defined), § 13-2308 (leading organized
crime); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 842-1, -6 (Supp. 1982) (enjoinng other business operations of
persons engaged in "organized crime"); NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.370 (1983) ("Criminal syndi-
cate" defined); N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 12.1-06.1 to -02.1 (Supp. 1983) (leading organized
crime); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.060 (Supp. 1984) (leading organized crime). Cali-
fornia defines "organized crime" as:
crime which is of a conspiratorial and (1) organized nature and which seeks to supply
illegal goods and services such as narcotics, prostitution, loan sharking, * * * gam-
bling, and pornography or, (2) through planning and coordination of individual ef-
forts, to conduct the illegal activities of arson for profit, hijacking, insurance fraud,
smuggling, operating vehicle theft rings, or systematically encumbering the assets of
a business for the purpose of defrauding creditors.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2(d) (West Supp. 1985) (asterisks in original, indicating deletion by
amendment; italics in original, indicating additions by amendment).
In 1970, while the House was considering OCCA, Representative Biaggi offered and
quickly withdrew an amendment that would have prohibited membership in the Mafia or La
Cosa Nostra. 116 CONG. REc. 35,342-43 (1970). The amendment defined the Mafia and La
Cosa Nostra as "nationally organized criminal groups composed of persons of Italian ancestry
forming an underworld government ruled by a form of board of directors, who direct or con-
duct a pattern of racketeering activity and control the national operation of a criminal enter-
prise in furtherance of a monopolistic trade restraining criminal conspiracy." Id.
For views that RICO was intended to protect legitimate business from organized crime,
see supra note 5.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
22. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 18, 1985) (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy
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on fraud,23 lending statistical support to the contention that inclusion of
the commercial fraud offenses in section 1961 is a chief cause of the com-
plained of overbreadth of civil RICO. Not surprisingly, other surveys
have produced similar results.24
The American Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking
and Business Law, Civil RICO Task Force (ABA Task Force) reported
that their computer database25 "contains at least 40 cases in which bro-
Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., appearing on behalf of the Dep't of Justice) (official gov-
ernment printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 23-24) [hereinafter
cited as J. Keeney, Hearings on RICO].
23. Id.
24. The ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Civil RICO Task Force
(ABA Task Force) surveyed approximately 270 reported civil RICO cases as of March, 1985.
According to the survey:
Forty percent of the cases involve allegations of securities fraud, and another 37
percent allege common law fraud in a commercial or business setting. The remaining
cases involve a variety of matters, including anti-trust or unfair competition (4 per-
cent), bribery or commercial bribery (4 percent), fraud not related to securities or
business transactions (3 percent), labor-related matters (2 percent), theft or conver-
sion (1 percent), and a range of other allegations. Approximately nine percent of the
cases involve allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated with pro-
fessional criminals (arson, bribery, commercial bribery, embezzlement, extortion,
gambling, theft, political corruption).
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 55-56 (1985).
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) surveyed 132 civil
RICO decisions, breaking the actions down into the following categories:
Securities transactions 57 [43%]
Commercial and contract disputes 38 [29%]
Commodities trading 6 [ 5%]
Bank loans 6 [ 5%]
Antitrust price fixing 3 [2%]
Religious disputes 2 [1.5%]
Divorce 1 [ 1%]
Union affairs 3 [2%]
Commercial bribery/kickbacks 2 [1.5%]
Political corruption (including
official extortion and bribery) 9 [7%]
Theft (by cleaners from apartment
dwellers) I [ 1%]
Viblent crimes (murder, arson,
extortion) 3 [2%]
[131] [100%]
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, The Authority to Bring Private Treble-
Damage Suits Under "RICO" Should Be Reformed 13 (Oct. 10, 1984) (manuscript) [hereinaf-
ter cited as AICPA White Paper], reprinted in ABA SEC'ION OF CORP., BANKING AND Busi-
NESS LAW, PROGRAM: TAsK FORCE ON CIVIL RICO § D (1985) (compilation of documents
to supplement a seminar on civil RICO). Apparently, one case did not fit into any category.
The report concludes that "cases that could fairly be characterized as having anything to do
with aiding the war on organized crime are a tiny minority." Id.
25. See supra note 24 for a percentage breakdown of the categories of actions brought
under RICO as of March, 1985.
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ker-dealers were the primary defendant, 32 cases in which banks were
the primary defendant, and over 20 cases in which lawyers or account-
ants were defendants."26 These figures may not demonstrate, as the Task
Force believes they do, "that legitimate businesses, as well as their pro-
fessional advisers, are the principal victims of such broad use of the stat-
ute."27 They do seem to indicate, however, that section 1964(c) has
embraced many defendants who are not the sort contemplated by the
enacting Congress.
28
The most frequently cited examples of non-criminal uses of RICO
are cases brought against securities brokers, banks, insurers and public
accounting firms. Securities firms are sued under section 1964(c) for
"churning," a practice in which brokers engage in excessive trading dis-
regarding the client's investment objectives in order to generate commis-
sions.29 Banks are brought under RICO in so-called "prime-rate
26. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 35.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 5. A partial list of defendants named in § 1964(c) suits includes: Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.; A.H. Robins Company, Inc.; Alexander Grant & Co.; Allstate Insur-
ance Co.; American Broadcasting Co.; Arthur Andersen & Co.; Bache Halsey Stuart Shields;
Bear Stearns & Co.; Chase Manhattan Bank; Citibank, N.A.; Coopers & Lybrand; Dean Wit-
ter Reynolds; Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.; E.F. Hutton & Co.; Exxon Corp.; Ford Motor
Co.; General Motors Corp.; Lehman Bros.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith; Miller
Brewing Co.; Morgan Stanley & Co.; Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.; Pantry Pride,
Inc.; Price Waterhouse & Co.; Prudential Bache Securities, Inc.; Prudential Life Insurance
Co.; Rockwell International Corp.; Shearson/American Express, Inc.; State Farm Fire & Cas-
ualty Insurance Co.; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.; Touche Ross & Co.; Un-
derwriters at Lloyds, London. See AICPA White Paper, supra note 24, at 16; Milner, A Civil
RICO Bibliography, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 409 (1985). While the preceding roster is neither
representative of even a majority of § 1964(c) defendants, nor necessarily evidence of abuse, it
serves to illustrate a source of concern to those who believe that civil RICO has become subject
to uses contrary to the intent of the enacting Congress.
29. See, e.g., Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In
Yancoski, plaintiff Lorraine Yancoski sought "prudent and safe" investments for a large sum
of money she had received in satisfaction of a judgment based on her husband's death. She
had not previously traded in securities. Herbert Krakovitz, a broker with E.F. Hutton, told
the plaintiff he could invest her money safely so that it would produce income and capital
growth. Based on Krakovitz's statements, plaintiff placed $100,000, the bulk of her assets, in a
discretionary account at E.F. Hutton, with Krakovitz as account broker. Id. at 90. Krakovitz
immediately began purchasing highly speculative stocks for the account, representing to plain-
tiff that these were cautious and safe investments. He engaged in heavy trading, which, during
one two-month period, nearly equaled the entire value of the account. Krakovitz next per-
suaded plaintiff to purchase securities on margin, misrepresenting the risks of a margin ac-
count and its suitability to her investment objectives. Krakovitz continued to engage in heavy
trading through which most of the plaintiffs assets were lost while payments for commissions
and interest on indebtedness to E.F. Hutton grew. Id.
The plaintiff closed her account and sued, seeking, among other things, treble damages
and attorney fees under § 1964(c) predicated on violations of § 1962(c). The court dismissed
the § 1964(c) count as to E.F. Hutton. The court reasoned that § 1964(c) prohibits a "person"
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cases"-where allegations of fraud arise from the practice of making
loans with a variable interest rate tied to a "prime rate" that is not, in
fact, the bank's lowest lending rate." Insurers that fail to pay claims are
charged with fraudulently entering into insurance contracts with no in-
from conducting the affairs of an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity.
While E.F. Hutton could be either the "person" or the "enterprise," it could not be both at the
same time. In this case, E.F. Hutton was the enterprise, and could not be liable in a claim
based on § 1962(c). Id. at 97. See infra note 47 for a discussion of the inability of a single
entity to qualify for both the "enterprise" and "person" requirements at the same time.
For more examples of RICO-associated churning, see Binkley v. Shaeffer, 609 F. Supp.
601 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
Roche v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 603 F. Supp. 1411 (M.D. Pa. 1984); In re Catanella & E.F.
Hutton & Co., Sec. Litigation, 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F.
Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 391
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), later proceeding, 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566
F. Supp. 210 (D.C. Colo. 1983); The Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark
Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
30. See, eg., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 526 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
In Kleiner, plaintiff executed notes to the defendant in the amount of $100,000 or more calling
for interest at one percent above the prime rate. The prime rate was defined in the note to be
"the rate available to the Bank's most credit-worthy commercial borrowers." Id. at 1020-21.
Defendant mailed plaintiff periodic statements reflecting the interest rate of one percent above
defendant's published prime rate. Id.
Plaintiff learned, however, that many of defendant's commercial customers were charged
interest rates substantially lower than the published prime rate. Plaintiff contended that the
published prime rate was not equal to the interest rate paid by the defendant's most credit-
worthy customers, as defendant had represented, and that the statements sent by the bank
fraudulently overstated the interest charges. Id. at 1021.
Plaintiff's § 1964(c) cause of action was based on the predicate offense of mail fraud. The
court dismissed the claim on the grounds "that the practice Plaintiff complains of has not
traditionally been treated as criminal in nature." Id. at 1022.
But see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 557 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. I11.
1983), 747 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). The Supreme Court in
Haroco, companion to Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985), affirmed the
court of appeals' decision that recognized as fraud the practice of "publishing" a prime rate
that was not the prime rate. Haroco, 105 S. Ct. at 3292.
The American Bankers Association does not view such cases as involving fraud at all:
Setting the prime rate, and even defining what the term means in a modern
economy, is an extraordinary complicated thing-far more so than the "prime rate"
plaintiffs make it out to be. I will not go into the details of why this is so, because
that is not the issue before Congress today. Suffice it to say that the banking industry
believes that there is no fraud inherent in tying an interest rate to some sort of a
benchmark figure-whether it is called a "prime rate" or something else.
Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 31, 1985) (statement of Robert J. Hodges, appearing on behalf of
The American Bankers Ass'n) (official government printing not yet available; cited from text
of prepared statement, at 3).
The practice appears to be a common one. See, e.g., Warren v. Manufacturer's Nat'l
Bank, 759 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1985); Chemical Bank v. Geller, 727 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984);
Kredietbank, N.V. v. Joyce Morris, Inc., No. 84-1903 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 1985) (available Jan.
14, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619
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tent to honor them.31 And public accounting firms that prepare inaccu-
rate financial statements are accused of fraud.32 In each of these
situations, two false statements by mail or phone may be sufficient to
constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity."33
B. Limiting Civil RICO
Of the nearly three hundred 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)34 suits surveyed by
the ABA Task Force, as of March, 1985, only nine had resulted in treble
damage awards.35 Of the rest, the majority were dismissed.36
Some district courts, relying on congressional legislative history on
the enactment of RICO, held that a RICO claim was deficient for failure
to allege a connection, or "nexus," between the defendant and organized
crime.37 In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,38 for example, the district
court stated that Congress' inability to define "organized crime" left to
the judiciary the case-by-case task of "limiting RICO to its intended
scope and filtering out many RICO claims that are just efforts to claim
F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 590 F. Supp.
445 (D. Or. 1984), later proceeding, 605 F. Supp. 592 (1985).
31. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
32. See, eg., County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill. 1983), affid,
773 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1985) (Arthur Andersen); Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y v. Alexander
Grant & Co., No. 85 Civ. 3595 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1985) (available Jan. 14, 1986, on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Onesti v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (Touche Ross); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Price Waterhouse); Ahern v. Gaussion, 611 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Or. 1985) (Touche Ross); Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 603 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
33. For a discussion of the "pattern of racketeering activity," see infra notes 219-57 and
accompanying text.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
35. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 58. It almost makes one wonder what
the fuss is about. The ABA Task Force added that one of those nine judgments was reversed,
B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 577 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd and re-
manded, 751 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984). However, that verdict was reinstated after the publica-
tion of the Task Force Report in B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., 617 F. Supp. 49
(D.N.J. 1985).
36. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 57.
37. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), afl'd on
other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); American Say.
Ass'n v. Sierra Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp. 888 (D. Colo. 1984); Bruns v. Ledbetter,
583 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticom-
modity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F.
Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256
(E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Barr
v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
38. 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), af'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),
cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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treble damages for ordinary violations of criminal or tort laws."39
The "nexus" requirement was not adopted by any court of ap-
peals." Other district courts noted that section 1964(c) was modeled
after the treble damage provision of the antitrust laws41 and that the
statement of findings and purposes for the Organized Crime Control Act
of 197042 "expressed [Congress'] concern that organized crime activities
harm innocent investors and competing organizations [and] interfere
with free competition."'43 These courts concluded that section 1964(c)
standing, like standing under the antitrust laws, required an allegation of
a competitive injury.'
The competitive injury requirement, like the nexus requirement, was
rejected by every court of appeals presented with the question.45 A
number of courts, however, without imposing a specific competitive in-
jury requirement, had imposed a standing requirement that called for a
so-called "racketeering" or "RICO-type" injury, different in kind from
39. Id. at 1360.
40. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 171. See Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), afid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985); Alcorn
County v. United States Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984); Sutliff, Inc. v.
Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984); Owl Constr. Co., Inc. v. Ronald Adams Contrac-
tor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
41. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), "Suits by persons injured; amount of recov-
ery," provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Standing to sue under this provision has been held to require allegation of an "injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
42. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. RICO is Title IX of the OCCA. See supra note 5.
43. Id. at 923.
44. See, e.g., Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc.,
535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207
(N.D. Ill. 1980).
45. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 293. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,
741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1008 (1983).
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that caused by the commission of the underlying predicate offenses.4 6
Some courts held that a section 1964(c) claim failed unless the plain-
tiff could show an "enterprise" separate from the person being sued.47
And the court of appeals in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.48 imposed a
standing requirement of sorts on a RICO defendant, ruling that a civil
RICO action could be brought only against a defendant who had already
been criminally convicted of the predicate offenses.4 9
None of these theories were universally adopted. Moreover, a single
46. See, eg., Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982), in
which the court ruled that a RICO plaintiff "must allege not only injury from the predicate
offenses, but injury of the type the statute was intended to prevent." Id. at 1007. In Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), the court reasoned that:
If a plaintiff's injury is that caused by the predicate acts themselves, he is injured
regardless of whether or not there is a pattern; hence he cannot be said to be injured
by the pattern, and the pattern cannot be said to be the but-for cause of the injury.
Id. at 517 (emphasis in original). See also Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Cal.
1984); Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 583 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Morosani v. First
Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 581 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 581 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Willamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co.,
577 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Or. 1984); Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co., 583 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), afj'd, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984); Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 579 F. Supp. 423
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Va. 1983); Waste
Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F.
Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.
Mich. 1983).
47. For the definition of "enterprise," see supra note 12. In Parnes v. Heinold Commodi-
ties, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the court reasoned that:
Section 1962(c) requires: (1) two parties, a "person" employed by or associated with
an "enterprise"; and (2) participation by the "person" in the conduct of the "enter-
prise" via a "pattern of racketeering activity."
By elementary principles of statutory construction, the Section 1964(c) cause of
action-a suit for "violation" of Section 1962-must be asserted against the violator
under the latter section. That violator is the "person" that has engaged in the "un-
lawful" conduct. It would be an obvious distortion to permit suit against the "enter-
prise" that had itself been infiltrated by the "unlawful" conduct or participation of
the "person"r-the "enterprise" that may itself be a victim of the racketeering
activity.
Id. at 23-24 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
48. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
49. Id. at 496. The Sedima court of appeals was the first court to require a prior convic-
tion. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 210. Earlier, in Taylor v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983), noting that the predicate acts must be criminal acts,
the court concluded that "[u]nless the sufficient facts are alleged by either showing previous
convictions or setting out probable cause, neither the defendant nor the court can ascertain
what prior conduct is said to constitute a predicate act." Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
In Taylor, a RICO count was dismissed for failure to plead with particularity. Id. at 684.
Though the alleged predicate acts were fraud offenses, id. at 680, the court did not so much
invoke the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), that averments of fraud be
pled with particularity, as to graft an analogous requirement on a RICO claim generally. The
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circuit would frequently produce contrary rulings.5 0 The judges simply
did not seem to know what to do with a racketeering act that was being
court stated "that it is appropriate to require that RICO be pled with the same particularity
that is required in the pleading of fraud." Id. at 682.
Taylor found support for its probable cause requirement in the earlier decision of Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Utah 1983).
Taylor, 572 F. Supp. at 683. Bache Halsey, too, had dismissed a RICO count for failure to
"state the facts with enough specificity to establish probable cause." Bache Halsey, 558 F.
Supp. at 1047. In Bache Halsey, the court reasoned that "[a]n offense is not 'indictable' merely
because it is alleged. Rather, to be indictable it must be 'well-founded' and based on probable
cause." Id. at 1045. Bache Halsey was followed in Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581
F. Supp. 408, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and in Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547,
1560 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
The question of probable cause was considered by the court in Haroco, Inc. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), afid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). In
Haroco, the court stated:
To establish its case at trial, a civil plaintiff must surely prove the acts of racke-
teering, but the district courts in Bache Halsey and Taylor appear to have moved that
requirement up to the pleadings stage. For several reasons, we do not agree that such
specificity is required at the pleadings stage.
First, a determination of probable cause in the criminal context ordinarily in-
volves some evaluation of the reliability of specific evidence. Even the most specific
allegations do not establish probable cause unless they are reliable. We are, to say
the least, perplexed as to how a court might undertake such evaluations of reliability
[A] grand jury has significant investigative powers and resources, including a
broad subpoena power. Before it decides whether to indict a person, it has extensive
opportunities to discover and evaluate relevant facts. It should be obvious that a civil
plaintiff has no similar discovery rights until it files its complaint. Yet the approach
of the district court in Bache Halsey appears to require a plaintiff to establish a case
before any discovery is permitted.... We see no grounds for demanding that a civil
RICO plaintiff essentially plead evidence and prove the case in the complaint.
Id. at 404 (emphasis in original).
50. For example, compare two decisions that occurred within two weeks of each other in
the Southern District of New York. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), Judge Cooner stated:
[I]t seems appropriate to limit the extraordinary private remedy of§ 1964 to the class
of plaintiffs who have suffered a competitive injury by reason of the defendant's rack-
eteering activities. The legislative history reveals that RICO's civil remedy was
modeled after the relief available in the antitrust area. The analogy to the antitrust
laws is reinforced by the language of § 1964(c), which is virtually identical to that of
§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, and gives standing only to one "injured in his
business or property." In the statement of findings and purposes which accompanied
RICO, Congress expressed its concern that "organized crime activities in the United
States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors
and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, [and] seriously burden
interstate and foreign commerce." Pub. L. 91-454 at § 1. This suggests an injury to
competition ....
Id. at 1241 (citations omitted). Two weeks later, Judge Duffy, writing in Mauriber v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), analyzed the same issue
somewhat differently:
I do not believe that the "racketeering" and "competitive injury" requirements are
consistent with the legislative history .... The legislative history shows that Con-
gress rejected early efforts to draft RICO-like statutes within the antitrust context,
apparently on the grounds that anti-trust concepts like "standing" and "proximate
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used against everyone but racketeers. All that, of course, was before the
Supreme Court decided Sedima.
C. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.51
1. Statement of the case
The Sedima case arose out of a joint venture between Imrex Co.,
Inc. (Imrex), an American company, and Sedima, S.P.R.L. (Sedima), a
Belgian company, to sell electronic components to European custom-
ers. 2 Sedima alleged that Imrex had furnished Sedima with deliberately
falsified invoices, credit memos and purchase orders in order to inflate
costs and fraudulently deprive Sedima of its share of the venture's profits.
The RICO counts were based on the predicate offenses of mail fraud and
wire fraud.53 In dismissing those counts, the trial court ruled that
Sedima lacked standing to sue under section 1964(c).54 The court relied
on two distinct lines of cases. One line had limited standing to claimants
who could allege a "competitive injury"; the other required a "racketeer-
ing injury."'55 Ruling that one or the other of these theories was correct,
the trial court determined, without stating a preference, that plaintiff's
RICO counts failed under either of them.
6
2. The Second Circuit's opinion
The court of appeals, affirming the trial court, rejected the "compet-
itive injury" requirement, narrowing the field to a distinct racketeering,
or "RICO-type," injury "of the kind the statute was designed to deter."
57
The court defined this injury in terms which suggested a revival of the
cause" would create "inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons
injured by organized crime who might seek treble damage recover." [sic]
Moreover, an examination of the statute's language reveals no basis for the
"racketeering injury" requirement....
Because the "racketeering injury" requirement seems contrary to the language
of the statute and is unsupported in the legislative history, I believe it suffices for
plaintiff to allege injury caused by the predicate acts.
Id. at 1240-41 (citations omitted).
51. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
52. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3275
(1985).
53. Id. at 485.
54. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 741 F.2d
482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). "For purposes of the question before me I
need not deterine which of these two constructions is more appropriate, since plaintiff's claim
fails under either one." Id.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46 for a discussion of these two limiting
requirements.
56. Sedima, 574 F. Supp. at 965.
57. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
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"nexus" requirement.5  Reasoning that RICO was enacted to deal with
the harm caused to competition and to the market by organized crime's
infiltration of legitimate businesses and operation of illegitimate busi-
nesses, the court concluded that only "this kind of harm" justifies stand-
ing to sue under RICO.59
The court also ruled that a civil RICO action could be brought only
against a defendant who had been criminally convicted of the predicate
offenses.60 The court distinguished the Clayton Act provision which pro-
vided a cause of action to anyone injured in his business or property "by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" from RICO's provi-
sion of standing to sue to one injured "by reason of a violation of section
1962. "61 The difference in language suggested to the court that Congress
intended that a private civil RICO suit could be brought only against a
defendant who had been convicted of at least the predicate acts.62 The
court concluded that had Congress intended "to permit defendants in
every 'garden-variety' fraud or securities violation case to be stigmatized
as 'racketeers,' on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence, it would
have said so in plainer language than it did."
63
58. See supra notes 37-39 for a discussion of the "nexus" requirement.
59. 741 F.2d at 495-96.
60. Id. at 496.
61. Id. at 498 (emphasis in original). See infra Appendix A for the full text of § 1964(c);
see supra note 41 for the full text of the Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
62. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 497-98 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982)).
63. Id. at 503 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the court questioned whether Congress in-
tended "to give civil courts power to determine whether an act is 'indictable' in the absence of
a properly returned indictment or 'chargeable' absent an information." Id. at 500. Citing the
fifth amendment provision that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury," the court concluded
that without the requirement of a prior conviction for civil RICO actions, "every private plain-
tiff becomes his own one-person grand jury, or in the case of state felonies chargeable by infor-
mation, his own prosecutor." Id. Thus, the court determined that the requirement of a prior
conviction avoids the "serious constitutional questions" inherent in a civil remedy designed
partly "to avoid the constitutional protections of the criminal law." Id. at 500 n.49.
Absent a prior conviction requirement, the court argued that a plaintiff in a civil RICO
suit should be required to prove the predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt, inasmuch as
RICO calls only for criminal conduct to be punished. Id. at 501-02. The court determined
that to expect juries to understand and apply different standards of proof to different elements
of the cause of action would create intolerable confusion. Id. at 502.
The court concluded that the criminal conviction requirement does not pose a "significant
additional barrier" to a RICO plaintiff, since the defendant would be able to block discovery in
any event by invoking the fifth amendment wherever a criminal conviction is possible. Id. at
503.
It is understandable that the court of appeals, faced with the implications of attaching a
criminal "stigma" by means of a civil burden of proof, discerned a constitutional dilemma that
could only be resolved by choosing between a prior conviction requirement and a stricter stan-
dard of proof. The Supreme Court, however, did "not view the statute as being so close to the
CONGRESS & CIVIL RICO
3. The Supreme Court reversal
The Supreme Court first expressed its understanding of the lower
court's "concern over the consequences of an unbridled reading of the
statute,"" and then proceeded to deliver one. Relying on "the plain
words of the statute,"6 the Court stated that "we cannot agree with the
court below that Congress could have had no 'inkling of [§ 1964(c)'s]
implications.' Congress' 'inklings' are best determined by the statutory
language that it chooses, and the language it chose here extends far be-
yond the limits drawn by the Court of Appeals.
66
Accordingly, the Court ruled that neither the statutory language nor
the legislative history warrants a requirement of a prior conviction.6
Without deciding what standard of proof is applicable to a civil RICO
proceeding, the Court indicated that a preponderance would be accepta-
ble. 8 Pointing to "a number of settings" in which "conduct that can be
punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt will
support civil sanctions under a preponderance standard,"69 the Court
stated that the fact that "offending conduct is described by reference to
criminal statutes does not mean that its occurrence must be established
by criminal standards or that the consequences of a finding of liability in
a private civil action are identical to the consequences of a criminal
conviction."70
The Court stated that "a civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater
[stigma] than do a number of other civil proceedings."'" Further, the
Court stated that the prior conviction requirement for the predicate acts
alone does not protect against an unfair imposition of the "racketeer"
label, and any problem with "stigmatizing a garden variety defrauder by
means of a civil action ... is not reduced by making certain that the
constitutional edge." Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3283. The Court stated that the same conduct can
legitimately result in both criminal and civil liability, noting "tt]he familiar provisions for both
criminal liability and treble damages under the antitrust laws." Id. Of course, the Clayton
Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) provides treble damages for conduct which may also give rise
to criminal liability under the antitrust laws. It does not, however, designate the same conduct
proved in a civil suit as criminal. RICO does just that.
64. 105 S. Ct. at 3278.
65. Id. at 3285 n.13.
66. Id. (quoting Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492) (brackets suppled by Court).
67. Id. at 3281-84.
68. Id. at 3282-84.
69. Id. at 3282 (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354
(1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47-49 (1914)).
70. Id. at 3283.
71. Id.
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defendant is guilty of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt. 72
The Court concluded its rejection of the prior conviction require-
ment by noting that such a requirement would be inconsistent with Con-
gress' underlying policy concerns.7 3 Pointing out that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c)74 is a private attorney general provision designed in part "to fill
prosecutorial gaps,"' 75 the Court determined that that purpose would be
defeated "if private suits could be maintained only against those already
brought to justice.
76
Turning to address the requirement of a RICO-type injury, the
Court noted the "vagueness of that concept ' 77 in overruling the court of
appeals. Stating that "'racketeering activity' consists of no more and no
less than commission of a predicate act,"'78 the Court concluded that
where the defendant's conduct in violation of RICO's prohibitions in-
jures the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a section
1964(c) claim.79 The Court stated that there "is no room in the statutory
language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury'
requirement."8
In thus overturning both the prior conviction and standing require-
ments, the Court has given civil RICO its most expansive reading. The
Court recognized "that private civil actions under the statute are being
brought almost solely against [respected businesses allegedly engaged in a
pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct], rather than against
the archetypal, intimidating mobster."8" But, the Court continued, "this
72. Id. at 3283 (emphasis in original). It is arguable whether a prior conviction require-
ment, even for the predicate acts alone, would not protect against an unfair imposition of the
racketeer label. Such a requirement would carry with it the additional protection of the higher
burden of proof appropriate to criminal convictions. Even so, the Court noted that to the
extent that a § 1964(c) action is to be considered quasi-criminal, thereby calling for the protec-
tions applicable to criminal proceedings, the solution lies not in ensuring that such protections
were previously afforded in criminal proceedings but in providing those protections directly.
Id. at 3283-84. One such solution might be the variable standard of proof which the court of
appeals rejected as impractical. For a discussion of the standard of proof, see infra notes 192-
217 and accompanying text.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
75. 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 3285.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3287. The Court further acknowledged that "RICO is evolving into something
quite different from the original conception of its enactors." 105 S. Ct. at 3287. But, the Court
continued, the "fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Id. (quoting Haroco,
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defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its correc-
tion must lie with Congress."82
IV. THE DEBATE
Critics of RICO's expansive scope, now endorsed by the Supreme
Court's reading of the statute, present four main arguments for limiting
the private action. First, they argue that the statute, intended as a
weapon against organized crime, is being used abusively against the "le-
gitimate businesses" it was designed to protect.83 Second, they argue
that RICO's treble damages provision is displacing "carefully crafted"
federal regulatory schemes, particularly in the securities industry."
Third, they argue that the statute has federalized areas of law tradition-
ally governed by the states.8 5 Finally, they argue that the federalization
of state law threatens to inundate the federal court system with actions
brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
86
A. Argument Civil RICO is Widely Abused
1. The racketeering statute has become a weapon
against legitimate businesses
Section 1964(c)'s critics variously describe the situations in which
the remedy has been invoked as "common commercial disputes,"87 "or-
dinary commercial disputes,"88 "mundane disputes,"89 "conventional
Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct.
3291 (1985)). See supra notes 5 & 19 for a discussion of Congress' original conception of
RICO; supra note 24 and accompanying text for statistical analyses of the statute's subsequent
use.
82. 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
83. See infra notes 87-96 & 140-51 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 98-102 & 131-37 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). These related issues are discussed concurrently, infra
notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
87. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 2, 1985) (statement of Philip J. Hoblin, Jr., Gen.
Couns. and Executive Vice President, Shearson/Lehman Bros. Inc.) (official government print-
ing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 3) [hereinafter cited as P. Hob-
lin, Hearings on RICO].
88. J. Keeney, Hearings on RICO, supra note 22, at 22.
89. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Irvin B. Nathan, appearing on
behalf of Am. Property & Casualty Ins. Indus.) (official government printing not yet available;
cited from text of prepared statement, at 4) [hereinafter cited as I. Nathan, Hearings on
RICO].
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business disputes,"90 "common garden variety disputes" 91 and, perhaps
in acknowledgment of the criminal conduct that is a necessary element of
a RICO count, as "garden-variety fraud."9 2
Irving Nathan, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee on
behalf of the American Property and Casualty Insurance Association,
presented examples of conventional business disputes which have been
brought within the scope of section 1964(c) by allegations of fraud:
At the last Senate hearing, a number of Senators asked for
concrete examples of abuse of private RICO. We are here to-
day to provide them....
[I]n the insurance industry, in a series of cases in the fed-
eral district court in Georgia, approximately fifteen insurance
companies have been sued in private civil RICO actions for
"mail fraud." In these cases, plaintiffs, often as purported rep-
resentatives of a class, contended that under the Georgia no-
fault statute, insurers may not subrogate claims for which they
have made full payment under automobile collision coverage
and that these companies have injured their policyholders by
"limiting" them to a single full recovery. The Georgia
Supreme Court has recently rejected the plaintiffs' interpreta-
tion of the state no-fault statute. However, this ruling came too
late for some insurance companies which had already made
multimillion-dollar settlements to avoid protracted litigation
and treble-damage, class action exposure. Out of these settle-
ments, over $2,000,000, in excess of one-third of the total re-
covery, was awarded to the plaintiffs' attorneys who concocted
this "racketeering" claim.
These cases point out how, through RICO, a disagreement
regarding the proper interpretation of a complicated state stat-
ute or an insurance policy can be escalated into a federal cause
of action alleging fraud and racketeering and seeking treble
90. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Oct. 9, 1985) (statement of Roger E. Middleton, appear-
ing on behalf of United States Chamber of Commerce) (official government printing not yet
available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 3) [hereinafter cited as R. Middleton, Hear-
ings on RICO].
91. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Edward I. O'Brien, appearing on
behalf of Securities Indus. Ass'n) (official government printing not yet available; cited from
text of prepared statement, at 6) [hereinafter cited as E. O'Brien, Hearings on RICO].
92. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488.
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damages and attorney's fees.93
Critics further argue that even where such allegations are wholly
unmerited, the mere threat of the "ruinous exposure"9" of a treble dam-
ages judgment, in addition to the potential "racketeer" stigma that trial
publicity attaches even to a successful defendant, induce defendants
named in RICO suits to settle the unwarranted claims.95 In addition to
93. I. Nathan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 80, at 16-17. Nathan offered further
examples:
[I]n Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983),
Lloyd's of London and the Lincoln Insurance Company, consistent with state-man-
dated claim settlement procedures, denied a claim under a fire insurance policy be-
cause they believed that the fire had been set by one of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued,
alleging inter alia, a violation of RICO in that "defendants [through the use of the
mails] have engaged in a scheme to defraud by fraudulently refusing to pay claims
without valid reasons in order to force persons to compromise their claims for an
amount less than they are entitled to under the insurance policies." Id. at 356.
As another example, in Activision, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., a
suit recently filed in federal district court in California, an insurance company was
sued as a racketeer when it refused to make payments under, and sought to rescind, a
director's and officer's liability policy on the ground that misstatements had been
made in the policy application. Plaintiffs allege as a RICO violation that defendant
was engaged in a scheme to issue such policies and collect premiums therefor with no
intention of fulfilling its obligations under these policies.
Id.
94. See infra text accompanying note 145.
95. J. Hoblin, Hearings on RICO, supra note 87, at 4-5. Hoblin's position as General
Counsel and Executive Vice President at Shearson/Lehman Brothers appears to have provided
him with considerable RICO experience:
The experience of Shearson Lehman Brothers with civil RICO parallels that of
the industry as a whole; that is, a lengthy period of inactivity followed by a rapid
acceleration of cases. The first RICO case brought against us occurred in 1982,
twelve years after the statute was enacted. By the middle of 1985, a total of 53 such
cases were brought against the firm. And since the Sedima decision, plaintiffs in five
previously filed Federal Court actions have made application to the courts to amend
their pleadings to include a RICO count.
Id. at 3. Hoblin offered the following examples of RICO-induced settlements:
In 1980, an individual opened an account in one of our Connecticut offices with
a portfolio of securities valued at $70,000. Two years later, following steady trading
losses aggregating some $40,000, this individual filed suit, alleging that the invest-
ments made were unsuitable and that all the purchases and sales of securities over the
two year period were unauthorized, and that the broker was churning the account,
with the sole object of generating commissions. The suit alleged violations of both
federal securities laws and RICO, and asked in excess of $200,000 in compensatory
damages. Although viable defenses existed, the downside risk of losing this case
under RICO would have aggregated more than $600,000 plus attorneys' fees of some
$50,000. Ultimately, after numerous unsuccessful motions to have the RICO portion
of the Complaint dismissed, we made a business decision to settle for the sum of
$85,000, more than twice the amount of trading losses.
In another situation, a New Jersey resident opened an investment account with
us in 1982 and over the next 18 months deposited over $2 million into his account.
In August 1983, following trading losses of over $100,000, this individual, not inci-
dentally an experienced investor and successful businessman, instituted an action al-
leging material misrepresentations concerning the investments proposed by our
broker. The suit alleged violations of the securities laws and RICO, and asked some
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the potential financial burden at risk in a RICO suit, it has been sug-
gested that public relations conscious companies are especially concerned
about the adverse publicity generated by a "racketeer" trial even if they
expect to, and do, win. Such companies, it is argued, will settle unjusti-
fied claims rather than expose themselves to such publicity.96
2. Civil RICO supplants "virtually every" federal
regulatory scheme
Critics of the current scope of section 1964(c) also object to the pro-
vision's encroachment upon other established areas of law. As Justice
Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co. 97
[T]he broad reading of the civil RICO provision... displaces
important areas of federal law. For example, one predicate of-
fense under RICO is "fraud in the sale of securities." By alleg-
ing two instances of such fraud, a plaintiff might be able to
bring a case within the scope of the civil RICO provision. It
does not take great legal insight to realize that such a plaintiff
would pursue his case under RICO rather than do so solely
under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which provide both express and implied causes of ac-
tion for violations of the federal securities laws. Indeed, the
federal securities laws contemplate only compensatory damages
and ordinarily do not authorize recovery of attorney's fees....
... [Civil RICO] virtually eliminates decades of legislative
$250,000 in damages. Despite reasonable confidence in our ability to defend, the
prospect of confronting a RICO award of over $800,000 in the event of a negative
decision forced a settlement on our part.
Finally, in a case of larger magnitude, four individuals who had invested a total
of over $1 million in the same stock over the period 1981-1984, brought suit against
the firm in Atlanta in 1984. The four alleged securities laws and RICO violations,
claiming misrepresentation in connection with recommendations of the stock by our
brokers and asking a total of $1.4 million in compensatory damages. Again, despite
confidence in mounting a credible defense, the possibility of paying well over $4 mil-
lion in damages and attorneys' fees proved sufficiently daunting so as to force us to
settle for $250,000.
I offer [these examples] as representative of a large and growing number of in-
stances where we believe a reasonable case could be made in defense of our conduct;
yet we cannot risk making this case because of the artificial imposition of a RICO
count, despite not the remotest connection to "organized crime and racketeering."
Id. at 4-6.
96. Id. at 3.
97. 105 S. Ct. 3295 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105
S. Ct. 3275 (1985) and American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Haroco, Inc., 106 S.
Ct. 3291 (1985)).
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and judicial development of private civil remedies under the
federal securities laws. Over the years, court [sic] have paid
close attention to matters such as standing, culpability, causa-
tion, reliance and materiality, as well as the definitions of "se-
curities" and "fraud." All of this law is now an endangered
species .... 98
The effect of section 1964(c) on the securities laws is further illus-
trated in the remarks of S.E.C. Commissioner Marinaccio to the ABA
Task Force:
First, RICO appears to permit private plaintiffs to recover
treble damages in cases where the Congress has expressly lim-
ited recovery under the securities laws to actual damages ....
Second, the breadth of RICO's provisions may even enable
certain private plaintiffs to make out claims under RICO where
they would not have standing to sue, or there is no implied
right of action, under the federal securities laws. Stated differ-
ently, RICO may permit private recovery for securities law vio-
lations which the Congress and the courts have determined
should not give rise to private liability under the securities laws.
This result is made even more anomalous by the fact that the
RICO plaintiff may obtain treble recovery ....
Finally, it appears that private plaintiffs who can allege
similar injury may be able to recover under RICO for violations
of the securities laws which the defendant committed against
third parties-notwithstanding the fact that such plaintiffs
could not recover at all under the federal securities laws.
99
A case could be made that Commissioner Marinaccio's illustrations
argue more forcefully that RICO provides a useful supplement, rather
than encroachment, to the securities law by providing remedies where
the securities laws provide none. But Edward I. O'Brien, president of the
Securities Industries Association, suggests that the specific remedies pro-
vided in the securities laws are tailored to the "technical ... nature" of
securities fraud itself, defined by the federal securities laws which elevate
"ordinary contract and agency disputes between brokers and their cus-
tomers into the realm of fraud."" O'Brien asserted:
For example, if a registered representative, for a broker-dealer,
98. Id. at 3294-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
99. Marinaccio, Memorandum for the American Bar Association Civil RICO Task Force,
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 9, at app. F, at 3-5 (emphasis in original).
100. E. O'Brien, Hearings on RICO, supra note 91, at 5.
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recommends a security to a customer on the basis that it is a
very conservative investment and, subsequently, the investment
proves to have been highly speculative and goes bankrupt, it is
not unusual for a plaintiff's attorney to file suit on the basis that
the federal securities fraud laws had been violated. Absent
these laws, it would ordinarily be thought that the controversy
involved, at most, either a violation of contract or some failure
under normal agency laws. The federal securities laws have
taken such contract disputes and elevated them into the realm
of fraud.' 0 '
In words which seem to sum up the attitude of both the securities
and banking industries, Donald E. Egan, testifying before the House Ju-
diciary Committee, warned that "unless remedial steps are taken by Con-
gress RICO may soon replace virtually every existing federal regulatory
scheme insofar as private remedies are concerned."' 2
3. Civil RICO federalizes state law and burdens
the federal court system
Section 1964(c)'s critics have also expressed concern over the feder-
alization of state common law remedies and the prospect of burying the
federal court system in an avalanche of civil RICO suits. 03 Evidence of
these related propositions exists in the high percentage of RICO suits
based on mail fraud and wire fraud"° and in the tremendous growth in
101. Id. at 5 n.7. Perhaps it is naive to expect a registered representative for a broker-dealer
to be able to distinguish a highly speculative investment from a very conservative one. For an
example of a registered representative unable to make the distinction, see Yancoski v. E.F.
Hutton, 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983); supra note 29.
102. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 29, 1985) (statement of Donald E. Egan) (official
government printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 9) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as D. Egan, Hearings on RICO].
103. I. Nathan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 89, at 22.
104. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. The federal mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes offer no private right of action. Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1178 (6th
Cir. 1979) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, mail fraud); Napper v. Ander-
son, Henley, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 837 (1975) (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud). Conse-
quently, fraud is normally compensable, if at all, only under state law.
The objection that RICO federalizes matters appropriately left to the states is always
raised in the context of the civil remedy. If this objection is valid it should be valid for crimi-
nal RICO, as well. Mail fraud and wire fraud are, however, federal crimes; moreover, the
requirements of both are not necessarily the same as for common law fraud offenses. For
example, conviction of violation of the mail fraud statute does not require a showing of reli-
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the number of RICO claims in recent years.10 5 And now that Sedima
has made early dismissal less likely, the number of RICO claims is ex-
pected to grow at an even faster rate.10 6 John Marshall Finch, represent-
ing The National Manufacturers Association, viewed with alarm the bar
education seminars "being prepared across the country to help private
litigators gear up to the new litigation opportunities against legitimate
business."10 7 As stated in the national advertisement for one series of
seminars:
In essence, for the first time there is a federal commercial
fraud statute-RICO--that cuts across the entire spectrum of
civil matters and provides treble damage remedies and attor-
ney's fees. Consequently, RICO is likely to be a growing, and
ance, a usual element of common law fraud. United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.
1976).
Nonetheless, not a single objection has been voiced in Senate nor House hearings-nor
elsewhere-to the nine state law felonies ("any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs") enumerated as predicate offenses in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1982)
either in connection with § 1964 (civil remedies) or § 1963 (criminal penalties). Obviously,
these offenses are not problematic to the "legitimate businesses" whose advocates have testified
before Congress. Arguably, these offenses are not as vague and therefore not as subject to
abuse as the fraud offenses may be. Also, these offenses are more closely related to the com-
mon conception of racketeers, and therefore more related to a target-everyone should be able
to agree-aimed at by the enacting Congress. Nevertheless, like the common law fraud that is
being "federalized," these nine offenses are state matters which are brought into federal court
when committed in conjunction with the other elements that make up a RICO count. As the
NAAG/NDAA states:
[T]he current controversy over RICO has not centered on its criminal provisions or
its possible civil application in the areas of violence, the provision of illicit goods and
services, or the corruption of governmental entities or unions.... Instead the con-
troversy has focused almost exclusively on private suits brought in the commercial
fraud area.
Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1985) (statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. and Nat'l
Dist. Att'ys Ass'n) (official government printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared
statement, at 9) [hereinafter cited as NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO]. Those spokesper-
sons who profess concern about federalization are either themselves unaware of the magnitude
of the problem, or the entire issue is a smokescreen sent up to obscure the true issues.
105. The ABA Task Force reports that "[o]f approximately 270 trial court decisions in the
database, three percent were decided before 1980, two percent in 1980, seven percent in 1981,
13 percent in 1982, 33 percent in 1983, and 43 percent in 1984." ABA TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 55.
106. O'Brien stated that "the number of decided [civil RICO] cases, to date .... are but the
first trickles of an onrushing flood created by the bursting of the dam as the result of the
Sedima case." E. O'Brien, Hearings on RICO, supra note 91, at 3.
107. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 9, 1985) (statement of John Marshall Finch, appear-
ing on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.) (official government printing not yet available; cited
from text of prepared statement, at 9) [hereinafter cited as J.M. Finch, Hearings on Rico].
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prominent feature of the commercial dispute landscape in cases
ranging from corporate takeovers to loan defaults. °8
Donald E. Egan suggested that state laws already provide adequate
remedies for common law frauds, precluding any need for RICO to oper-
ate in these areas.109 Moreover, a growing number of states have passed
their own so-called "little RICO" statutes, 1 0 thus eliminating any neces-
sity that might otherwise have been perceived for the federal courts to be
burdened with these actions.11
B. Rebuttal: There Is Scant Evidence that Civil RICO Is More
Abused than any Other Statute
1. Civil RICO neither significantly displaces state law nor burdens
the federal courts
The concern for the burden on the federal courts may be premature.
Though huge increases in the number of reported section 1964(c) deci-
sions occurred in each of the years following 1980-tripling in 1981,
nearly doubling in 1982 and more than doubling in 1983-only a thirty
percent increase occurred in 1984 followed by an increase of about
108. Id. at 10 (citing Legal Times, Aug. 5, 1985, at 9, col. 1).
109. D. Egan, Hearings on Rico, supra note 102, at 10. Egan, who represented the defend-
ant in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 577 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. I11. 1983),
affid in part and rev'd in part, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985)
(companion case to Sedima), argued that identical protections are available in twenty-two
(now twenty-three) states. Thus, he concluded that: "[E]ven if the opponents of any change in
the federal RICO statute are correct in their claims that an amendment will lessen its availabil-
ity for criminal and civil governmental prosecutions, identical provisions would still be avail.
able under state law." D. Egan, Hearings on Rico, supra note 102, at 10. See infra note 110 for
a list of the state "little RICO" statutes.
110. The so-called "little RICO" statutes are: ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to 2317
(West 1978 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186 (West Supp. 1985) (no private civil
action); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-17-101 to -109 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53-393 to -403 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01-.09 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-3402 to -3414 (1983 & Supp. 1985); HAwAI REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1976)
(actual damages and attorney's fee); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to -7805 (Supp. 1985); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 56-1/2, §§ 1651-1659 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (limited to narcotics); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-4-30.5-1 to -6, 35-45-6-1 to -2 (Burns 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1351-1356
(West 1985) (limited to narcotics; no private civil action); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to -11
(Supp. 1985); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 207.350-.520 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to -6.2
(West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3042-1 to -6 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-06.1-01 to
-05 (1985); 1985 Ohio Legis. Bull. §§ 1226-1234 (Anderson) (to be codified at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31-.36); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166-715-35 (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18 § 911 (Purdon 1983) (no private civil action); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 971 (1979 &
Supp. 1984) (no private civil action); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1-11 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76-10-1601 to -08 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.010-.901 (Supp. 1986);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80-.87 (West Supp. 1985).
111. D. Egan, Hearings on Rico, supra note 102, at 10.
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twenty to twenty-five percent in 1985.112 This apparent leveling off may
be nothing more than the result of pre-Sedima judicial restrictions which
rendered such suits futile in some jurisdictions (or resulted in early, unre-
ported dismissals of RICO counts).' 13 If this assessment is accurate, the
proliferation will likely resume in the post-Sedima era. It is also possible,
however, that the period of discovery and resulting proliferation is over.
In any event, the RICO experience furnishes evidence neither of a
significant displacement of state law nor of a burden to the federal court
system. The Department of Justice reported that section 1964(c) suits
constitute less than one-half percent of the annual federal private civil
caseload and that most of the suits could have been brought in federal
courts anyway. 1'4 Thus, section 1964(c) has increased the federal civil
caseload by less than one quarter of one percent, and this figure is further
reduced when the total-civil and criminal-caseload is considered.' 15
Nor is it certain, as has been suggested, that state laws provide ade-
quate remedies for claims now brought under section 1964(c). 116 It has
been argued that section 1964(c) provides a forum where all defendants
in a single action may be brought together who otherwise might be
reachable only in a multitude of suits scattered throughout various
states." 7 Of equal importance, the award of compensatory damages, a
usual state common law remedy, can never adequately compensate a loss
where attorneys' fees must be paid out of the amount recovered. As
Pamela Gilbert, staff attorney for the United States Public Interest Re-
search Group, has testified:
Although additional recovery, such as punitive damages, may
be available [under state common law causes of action], they
are discretionary with the court and can not be relied upon by a
plaintiff. This precludes many victims of fraud, whose actual
losses are less than the costs of a lawsuit, from suing the re-
sponsible party. This is a large class of victims since fraud
schemes are often designed to swindle relatively small amounts
112. See supra note 105. There were 141 federal district court civil RICO decisions in 1985.
Available Jan. 19, 1986, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file.
113. See supra notes 20-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of these limitations.
114. J. Keeney, Hearings on Rico, supra note 22, at 25.
115. Egan suggests, however, that the burdens imposed by RICO suits are not to be mea-
sured by quantity of suits alone: "Hardly a RICO complaint filed today is not the subject of a
barrage of motions addressed to its sufficiency-all of which are costly to litigants and time
consuming for the judges." D. Egan, Hearings on Rico, supra note 102, at 7. Much of this
problem, of course, stems from the many uncertainties concerning the scope of RICO, some of
which have been clarified by Sedima.
116. 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (1982).
117. See infra text accompanying note 286.
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of money from a large number of people.118
Where such a suit is instituted, any settlement must be for a fraction
of the actual loss. 119 The National Association of Attorneys General and
National District Attorneys Association (NAAG/NDAA) cited studies
showing that, as a result of the treble damages authorized by the Clayton
Act, "most antitrust suits are settled now at close to actual damages. '"120
Thus, the NAAG/NDAA concluded that "it may be necessary to au-
thorize treble damages to assure that deserving victims receive actual
damages in the RICO area."'' Put another way, "RICO is a part of a
very long trend toward economic justice for victims of crime."' 22
Additionally, compensatory damages provide no deterrent to profit-
able misconduct. In the words of the NAAG/NDAA:
If our society authorizes the recovery of only actual damages
for deliberate anti-social conduct engaged in for profit, it lets
the perpetrator know that if he is caught, he need only return
the misappropriated sums. If he is not caught, he may keep his
ill-gotten gains, and even if he is caught and sued, he knows
that he may be able to defeat part of the damage claims or at
least compromise it. In short, the balance of risk under tradi-
tional simple damage recovery provides little disincentive to
those who engage in such conduct.
123
It has been further suggested that the existence of little-RICO stat-
utes in twenty-three states, 124 with more pending, indicates that, even
without the federal RICO statute, "identical provisions would still be
available under state law." 125  But twenty-seven states have no little-
RICO legislation, and of those that do, several provide no private civil
118. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 29,1985) (statement of Pamela Gilbert, appearing on
behalf of United States Pub. Interest Research Group) (official government printing not yet
available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 4) [hereinafter cited as P. Gilbert, Hearings
on RICO].
119. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 n.16 (1984),
af'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
120. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 25.
121. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis in original).
122. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Oct. 9, 1985) (Statement of Steven Twist, Assistant Att'y
Gen. for the State of Ariz., appearing on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.) (official
government printing not yet available, cited from text of prepared statement) [hereinafter cited
as S. Twist, Hearings on RICO].
123. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 24-25.
124. See supra note 110 for a list of the 23 states.
125. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
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remedy. 12 6 Just as it is premature to worry about the burden imposed on
the federal court system by section 1964(c), it is premature to rely upon
the little-RICOs to relieve that burden. If any conclusion at all is to be
drawn from the increasing popularity of little-RICOs, it is that a growing
number of states perceive their own traditional remedies as inadequate.
2. Civil RICO supplements rather than supplants other federal law
Though RICO includes state offenses as predicate acts, the federal
statute contemplates something more than the commission of an act, and
its civil remedies as well as its criminal penalties are provided to supple-
ment, rather than displace, those provided for in state law. As the
Supreme Court stated in United States v. Turkette, 27 "RICO imposes no
restrictions upon the criminal justice systems of the States."' 28 Pointing
to section 904(c) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970-
"[n]othing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or
other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addi-
tion to those provided for in this title" 2 9--the Court concluded that
"under RICO, the States remain free to exercise their police powers to
the fullest constitutional extent in defining and prosecuting crimes within
their respective jurisdictions."'
130
Similarly, it has been suggested that RICO supplements rather than
preempts the securities laws. As Michael A. Bertz stated before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, "RICO was designed at least in part to deal
with the prior ineffectiveness of many laws in rooting out onerous pat-
terns of conduct. Securities laws.., fit into this pattern of prior limited
effectiveness in dealing with repetitive intentional conduct."'' In
Turkette, the Court stated that "the very purpose of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 was to enable the Federal Government to
address a large and seemingly neglected problem. The view was that
existing law, state and federal, was not adequate to address the
126. D. Egan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 102, at 10. Consequently, among the states
with no counterpart to § 1964(c) are: California, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Michi-
gan-representing a considerable portion of the population of the country. If the adoption by
all the states of little-RICO statutes would reduce whatever need exists for the federal statute,
it would also relieve whatever burden the federal statute imposes on the federal court system.
127. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
128. Id. at 586 n.9.
129. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(c), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
130. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586 n.9.
131. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Michael A. Bertz) (official gov-
ernment printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 6) (citing
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586) [hereinafter cited as M. Bertz, Hearings on RICO].
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problem."1 32
In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,133 the Supreme Court noted
that parallel provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provide that "[t]he rights and remedies provided
by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity."' 34 Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, concluded that the "provisions confirm that the remedies in
each Act were to be supplemented by 'any and all' additional
remedies."'
135
The additional elements which must be proven for a RICO claim, it
has been argued, indicate that section 1964(c) does indeed supplement
rather than preempt the securities laws:
A violation of the anti fraud provision of the Securities Ex-
change Act requires only one misrepresentation, whereas a
RICO violation requires commission of at least two predicate
acts in a "pattern" of activity. Furthermore, a Securities Ex-
change Act violation may result from recklessness, which is not
sufficient scienter to satisfy the RICO requirement that fraud in
the sale of securities involve an "offense" "punishable" under
federal law.
36
As Bertz concluded, "not all securities lawsuits can or should in-
clude RICO claims."'' 37 The real difficulty, however, appears in deter-
132. 452 U.S. at 586.
133. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
134. Id. at 383 (citing Securities Act of 1933, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982)).
135. Id. Similarly, the ABA Criminal Justice Section, RICO Cases Committee (RICO
Cases Committee) stated:
An impression is apparently widespread among the securities industry that
RICO simply "overlaps" all securities fraud. This impression is mistaken. RICO
says "offenses" involving "fraud in the sale of securities" "punishable under any law
of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982). "Offense" means criminal
offense. Black's Law Dictionary 975 (5th ed. 1979).... Accordingly, only the crimi-
nal fraud provisions of the securities acts fall within RICO.... Merely negligent
conduct or a transaction that only operates as a fraud does not fall within the statute.
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 681, 701-02 (1980) (intent to defraud rather than negli-
gence in § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, or § 17a(l) of the 1934 Act, but not untrue state-
ments or admissions or transactions that operate as a fraud under § 17(a)(2) or (3) of
the 1933 Act). Such an overlap between statutes is neither "unusual nor unfortu-
nate." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969).
RICO CASES COMMITTEE, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPEC-
TIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION, A REPORT OF THE
RICO CASES COMMITrEE 42 n.28 (1985) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as COMPRE-
HENSIVE PERSPECTIVE].
136. M. Bertz, Hearings on RICO, supra note 131, at app. A, at 8.
137. Id. There is some support for the view that no securities lawsuit should include RICO
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mining which lawsuits, whether involving securities or otherwise, ought
to include RICO claims. The Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
138
noting that "Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate'
claims. This is the view expressed by Edward I. O'Brien, President of the Securities Industry
Association, as well as by Chairman John S.R. Shad of the SEC. See E. O'Brien, Hearings on
RICO, supra note 91, at 5 ("remedies of RICO are most certainly not needed when... specific
remedies already exist under the federal securities laws"); Hearings on RICO Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, (Oct. 2, 1985) (statement of
John S.R. Shad, Chairman, United States See. & Exch. Conm'n) (official government printing
not yet available; cited from prepared statement, at 9) (supporting "regulated industry" ex-
emption from civil RICO suits). However, the North American Securities Administrators,
Inc., issued the following resolution:
Be it resolved that the Board of Directors of the North American Securities Adminis-
trators, Inc. ("NASAA") fully supports the concept of private rights of action under
the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") involv-
ing securities, mail and wire fraud, and therefore strongly supports both retention of
federal securities, mail and wire fraud violations as predicate offenses, and retention
of treble damages for private civil actions under RICO.
Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 31, 1985) (statement of Philip A. Feigin, Assistant Sec. Comm'r,
Colo. Div. of See., on behalf of the N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n) (official government printing
not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 3) [hereinafter cited as P. Feigin,
Hearings on RICO].
Note that RICO affects other regulated industries as well, for example the banking indus-
try. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) asked that bank fraud be included as
a predicate offense to ensure that the FDIC can continue to expand its use of RICO's supple-
mental remedies. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 20,1985) (statement of Daniel W. Persinger, Dep-
uty Gen. Counsel, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., appearing on behalf of the Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp.) (official government printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at
11) [hereinafter cited as D. Persinger, Hearings on RICO].
Professor Blakey, see supra note 20, suggested a "regulated industry exception" from civil
RICO to the ABA Task Force. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 268-69. Under
such an exception:
[A] private Civil RICO treble damage remedy... would not be available in those
cases where the plaintiff could seek redress of his injuries caused by the defendants'
violative conduct under existing express or implied damage remedies under federal
securities statutes, the federal Commodity Exchange Act, federal banking laws or
other comparable laws regulating particular industries or particular classes of activi-
ties. Second, the private civil treble damage remedy would not be available in those
cases arising in an industry or type of activity where there is an extensive federal
regulatory scheme, but where the Congress or the courts have determined that no
private damage cause of action is appropriate....
There is one principal defect in attempting to achieve regulatory reform through
a "regulated industry" exception approach: Why should not a treble damage remedy
be available to a business entity that is infiltrated by an organized criminal group
through commission of multiple mail, wire and securities fraud offenses? Just be-
cause the business entity is within the sphere of an overall federal regulatory statute,
le., the federal securities laws or the federal banking laws, why should it be unable to
attack the criminal infiltration with the Civil RICO remedy?
Id. at 270-72.
138. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
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enterprises," '139 stated that the "former enjoy neither an inherent inca-
pacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences.' 140 As
stated by Domenic P. Gentile:
For better or for worse, the time has come to admit that the
persons who operate some of the largest institutions in our
country do not possess an abundance of rectitude and from
time to time employ fraudulent strategies and tactics which, be-
cause of the economic power which they wield, make street
thugs pale in comparison. . . . [B]ig business does far more
harm to our society as a whole than structured "criminal
groups" can ever hope to do.14'
And Philip A. Feigin, on behalf of the North American Securities Ad-
ministrators Association, Inc., stated that:
Euphemisms like "commercial disputes," "commercial
frauds," "garden variety frauds" and "technical violations" un-
derscore the problem. These are sanitized phrases often used
by "legitimate businesses and individuals" to distinguish their
frauds from the "real" frauds perpetrated by the "real" crooks.
Yet all willful fraudulent conduct has in common the elements
of premeditation, planning, motivation, execution over time
and injury to victims and commerce. And it is all crime. 42
One is thus reminded that the conduct for which RICO supplies its
remedies is, in fact, criminal conduct, and that only criminal conduct
will expose a defendant to liability. In the words of the NAAG/NDAA:
Legitimate business people, in fact, have little to fear from
federal or state RICO legislation. Neither makes criminal that
conduct that is not now already criminal under its predicate
offenses. Both merely provide enhanced sanctions and new
civil enforcement mechanisms. Legitimate business people do
not perpetrate fraud; they are victimized by it. Good faith
commercial disputes, moreover, do not constitute criminal
fraud. Nothing in RICO provides to the contrary. 
143
Similarly, Bertz concluded that "there is no need for Congress to protect
139. Id. at 3287 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981)).
140. Id. (citations omitted).
141. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 31, 1985) (statement of Dominic P. Gentile) (official
government printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 4-5) [hereinaf-
ter cited as D. Gentile, Hearings on RICO].
142. P. Feigin, Hearings on RICO, supra note 137, at 13.
143. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 15 (emphasis in original).
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the legitimate business or professional so long as that word 'legitimate'
applies to the manner in which the business or profession is actually con-
ducted, and is not merely a label reflecting an undeserved status."' 144
3. Legitimate businesses have nothing to fear from civil RICO
Also disputed is the claim, endorsed by Justice Marshall, that, ac-
companied by the threat of "ruinous exposure" and a racketeering
stigma, even wholly meritless RICO suits have become the vehicles of
extortion of unwarranted settlements. 14  Indeed, the ABA survey cited
by Justice Marshall as authority for this effect in reality seems to have
provided little substantiation. In that survey, out of forty respondents
reporting "that the client company had been threatened with a Civil
RICO claim... [a]lmost no one thought the threats had any significant
effect. Some said that a threat of a RICO claim only made the parties
more intransigent because of the 'racketeer' label."'
14
The NAAG/NDAA, while conceding that "it may be that some
RICO suits have been brought by unethical plaintiff's lawyers hoping to
obtain quick settlements by the filing of strike suits,"' 47 found it
difficult to understand how Justice Marshall could believe that
a suit with "no merit" faces a defendant with "ruinous expo-
sure." If the plaintiff's suit has no merit, his chance of success
is zero, and zero multiplied by three (or any other number) is
still zero. Before this Committee accepts Justice Marshall's
claim from any witness who appears before it, it ought to ask
for the names of the defendants and the cases allegedly so set-
tled. It should then inquire of the plaintiffs what their evidence
was. It is doubtful that you will find that the litigation was
meritless. It is doubtful, in short, that responsible corporate or
other defendants are paying off strike suits in the RICO-or
any other area-at more than their settlement value, no matter
what the theory of the complaint is. Neither the racketeer label
nor the threat of treble damages will convince prudent manag-
144. M. Bertz, Hearings on RICO, supra note 131, at 7. Indeed, the enacting Congress
chose to prohibit conduct, rather than a status. See supra note 20. The term "legitimate busi-
ness" is no more capable of definition than is "organized crime," and where both are engaged
in the same conduct it is no more justified to seek to exempt one from the consequences of such
conduct than to attempt to limit such consequences to the other.
145. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3292, 3295 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in Sedima and American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291) (citing
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 60).
146. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 60.
147. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 15.
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ers lightly to surrender scarce resources merely because another
files a suit. No matter how colorfully it is phrased, the claim
that such managers act against their own interests is not
credible. 148
Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, suggested "a simple
cure for their perceived fear of RICO: If there are no... illegal activi-
ties, there will be no RICO action."1 49
Steven Twist, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, pointed out
that "[t]here is scant evidence that RICO has created baseless litigation
in any greater proportion than other causes of action.... [T]here is now
no empirical data that shows RICO is more abused than an 'average'
cause of action." 5' Conceding that the abuse of RICO is an appropriate
topic for congressional consideration, Twist cautioned that measures di-
rected to the prevention of abuse "must... be directed to the causes of
abuse, not at protecting the perpetrators whose conduct necessitates
RICO in the first instance."
1 51
It is unlikely that anyone will take exception to the principle that
legislation be directed to the causes of abuse. The various bills and pro-
posals examined in the next section, however, reflect the broad disagree-
ment concerning both the causes of abuse and the identities of the
perpetrators whose conduct necessitates the statute.
V. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. The Bills
Congress is currently considering three bills, each presenting a dif-
ferent solution to the problems which have emerged from fifteen years of
judicial construction of RICO.
H.R. 2517152 was introduced on May 15, 1985, by Congressman
John Conyers, Jr. '53 The bill sets forth the following amendments to
RICO:
(1) To change RICO's title to Criminal Enterprises and
148. Id. at 37-38 (emphasis in original).
149. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 30, 1985) (statement of Dave Frohnmayer, Att'y Gen. of
Or., appearing on behalf of Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.) (official government printing not yet
available; cited from text of prepared statement, exhibit, letter of June 3, 1985, at 1) [hereinaf-
ter cited as D. Frohnmayer, Hearings on RICO].
150. S. Twist, Hearings on RICO, supra note 122, at 14 (emphasis in original).
151. Id. at 19.
152. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see infra Appendix B for full text of H.R.
2517.
153. Democrat, 1st dist., Mich.
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Corruption of Enterprises, and to delete the word "racketeer"
from the statute, substituting the word "criminal";
(2) To change the definition of "enterprise" to "a busi-
ness or business-like association of persons," and specifically to
include governments and government agencies. This would
seemingly delete "any individual" from the present definition;
(3) To define "pattern" as:
(a) acts separate in time and place that are "interre-
lated by a common scheme or plan,"
(b) committed within five (instead of ten) years of
an indictment or information, thereby introducing a five year
statute of limitations and a prior indictment or information re-
quirement on 18 U.S.C. § 1964,114 and
(c) which acts are not both violations of the same
fraud provision (excluding securities fraud);
(4) To add a requirement that a defendant "knowingly"
violate section 1962 (in addition to the scienter requirements
inherent in the predicate offenses); and
(5) To add a new section 1962 prohibition, against par-
ticipating in a supervisory capacity in a "criminal syndicate"
defined in the bill).
H.R. 2943155 introduced on July 10, 1985, by Congressman Freder-
ick C. Boucher,156 includes the following amendments to section 1964(c):
(1) To impose a requirement that a civil defendant first
be criminally convicted of "racketeering activity" (a predicate
offense) or a violation of section 1962; and
(2) To install a one year statute of limitations, which
would begin running at the time of conviction.
S. 1521,157 introduced on July 29, 1985, by Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, 158 includes the following amendments to section 1964(c):
(1) To limit section 1964(c) recovery to "competitive, in-
vestment, or other business injury";
(2) To require that one predicate offense be an offense
other than mail fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud; and
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(b) (West Supp. 1985).
155. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see infra Appendix C for full text of H.R.
2943.
156. Democrat, 9th dist., Va.
157. S. 1521, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); see infra Appendix D for full text of S. 1521.
158. Republican, Utah.
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(3) To permit award of costs and attorney's fees to a de-
fendant where a 1964(c) claim is "frivolous and without merit."
All these measures are aimed at curbing the perceived abuses of sec-
tion 1964(c). While the "frivolous suit" provision of Senator Hatch's bill
addresses only the most egregious abuses of section 1964(c) as it is now
written, the other proposed provisions, if enacted, may have considerable
impact on the scope and viability of the private remedy as well as other
aspects of RICO. If the private civil remedy is to be amended, the im-
pact on RICO will depend upon the resolution of the major issues which
have emerged from the section 1964(c) experience. This Comment will
examine the issues that are receiving the most attention in Congress.
They are:
(1) RICO-type injury;
(2) prior conviction and burden of proof,
(3) pattern of racketeering activity;
(4) fraud; and
(5) additional measures to prevent abuse.
B. The Issues
1. A RICO-type injury
S. 1521159 includes an attempt to define the kind of injury addressed
by RICO and to limit the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(e)" ° to such injury.
The bill would amend section 1964(c)'s provision of the treble damages
remedy for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" to allow
such a remedy to "[a]ny person suffering competitive, investment, or
other business injury." '161
The amendment would not introduce that indefinable separate-
from-the-predicate-acts injury favored by the court of appeals in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.," 2 nor present a barrier to plaintiffs like Sedima 63
159. See infra Appendix D for complete text.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
161. See infra Appendix D for complete text.
162. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). "For purposes of clarity," the court identified the RICO
standing requirement as a "'racketeering injury' requirement [that] carries with it... the
obligation that the plaintiff show injury different in kind from that occurring as a result of the
predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an
activity which RICO was designed to deter." Id. at 496. See the discussion of Sedima, supra
notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
163. Sedima's injury would probably be considered a business injury within the scope of S.
1521. The standing requirement proposed in S. 1521 is therefore less restrictive than either of
those adopted by the Sedima trial court or that adopted by the court of appeals. See supra text
accompanying notes 56-59.
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In fact, the amendment proposes to eliminate from the statute only in-
jury to property unconnected to business.
Senator Hatch's statement before the Judiciary Committee may ex-
plain his purpose in proposing the amendment:
In the wake of the Supreme Court's Sedima and Horoco rul-
ings, . .. RICO's treble damage remedy is being used almost
exclusively to bring common commercial disputes into federal
courts. This has some far-reaching implications .... For in-
stance, common law commercial disputes are falling almost ex-
clusively under federal court jurisdiction; common law
commercial disputes have become the basis of suits for treble
damages and the shifting of attorney fees; common law com-
mercial disputes have caused legitimate businesses to be stigma-
tized as "racketeers."' 164
It is difficult to understand how the elimination of private property
injuries from section 1964(c) will contribute in any signicant way to the
reduction of common law commercial disputes brought into federal court
under RICO, since such disputes usually involve commercial litigants
whose interests would be unaffected by the new provision. Depending
upon whether an injury to business property is an injury to the busi-
ness, 165 the amendment would not so much define the kind of injury as
specify the persons who may sue. In short, a business may sue but a
private person may not unless his injury is to an "investment." This
would create the anomalous result in some cases of denying a RICO rem-
edy to a private person while providing it for a business suffering identi-
cal injuries.
An additional effect of Senator Hatch's amendment, if adopted,
would be to deny the use of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) 166 to all non-business
entities including state and local governments and government agencies,
164. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Orrin B. Hatch) (official
government printing not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 1).
165. Justice Marshall, dissenting from the Sedima Court's rejection of a special injury
standing requirement, explained his conclusion:
Congress intended to give to businessmen who might otherwise have had no available
remedy a possible way to recover damages for competitive injury, infiltration injury,
or other economic injury resulting out of, but wholly distinct from, the predicate
acts.... Indeed, that is why Congress provided for recovery only for injury to
business or property-that is, commercial injury-and not for personal physical or
emotional injuries.
105 S. Ct. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
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as well as to the federal government.167 There is nothing in the Senator's
statement to indicate that such a result is intended. Though the effect on
governments' use of section 1964(c) could be easily remedied by writing
their authority to sue into the statute, we would still be left with an
amendment that produces an arbitrary result with little, if any, predict-
able benefit.
The ABA Task Force, however, distinguishes between situations in
which the enterprise is the victim or instrument on the one hand and the
perpetrator on the other, recommending that a standing barrier be im-
posed only in the first instance. 68 The Task Force offers this test:
(1) Where the enterprise is the victim or instrument of
the RICO violation, injury compensable under Civil RICO
should be limited to competitive injury, infiltration injury, and
other injury wholly distinct from that caused directly by the
predicate offenses;
167. As Ohio Attorney General Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., stated: "S. 1521 ... would
unjustifiably remove standing to all individual victims, governmental bodies, labor unions or
their members, non-profit corporations and others while limiting it exclusively to business enti-
ties." Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 9, 1985) (statement of Anthony J. Celebrezze, Att'y Gen.
of Ohio, appearing on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.) (official government printing
not yet available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 7) [hereinafter cited as A. Cele-
brezze, Hearings on RICO]. Thus, the NAAG/NDAA asked:
Why should business people alone be given a treble damage claim against organized
or white-collar offenders? That would turn RICO into a piece of special interest
legislation. What about individuals injured when they are not engaged in a commer-
cial relationship? What about consumers who are not in business, but are still partic-
ipating in the marketplace? What about unions that cannot be injured
"competitively," through "investment," and have no "businesses?" Unions, particu-
larly, have been taken over by organized crime figures. Union treasuries have been
victimized by embezzlement; their welfare funds have been exploited by corrupt lend-
ing practices. It was true in 1970; it is true in 1985. The protection of unions and
welfare funds was a central aspect of the principal, albeit not exclusive, reason RICO
was adopted in 1970. What has happened since 1970 to warrant cutting back on the
scope of the original statute? Why exclude unions from the Act's protections at this
late date? What, too, of union members? Why should they be excluded? What of
other non-commercial entities, like charities, which have no "business?" What of
governmental units? They seldom have "competition," can be "invested in" or have,
strictly speaking, "a business?" Why should we exclude general injury to govern-
mental property by criminal activities under RICO?
NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 22-23 (emphasis in original). As is the
case with individuals, government entities at all levels have a strong interest in § 1964(c). See
infra notes 274-82 and accompanying text.
But compare Arizona's little-RICO statute, which provides the treble damage remedy for
"[a] person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by racketeering." ARiz.
Rv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(A) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). As is true of the federal stat-
ute, Arizona defines "racketeering" as any act "chargeable or indictable" involving specifically
enumerated offenses-that is, criminal conduct. Id. § 13-2301(D)(4).
168. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 320.
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(2) Where the enterprise is, under the Task Force's view
of appropriate standards of derivative liability, a perpetrator of
the predicate offenses, then injury compensable under Civil
RICO should include competitive injury, infiltration injury, in-
jury caused by the predicate offenses themselves, and any addi-
tional injury wholly distinct from that caused directly by the
predicate offenses.
169
Even assuming that a definition could be formulated which would
provide a practical distinction between an enterprise as instrument and
an enterprise as perpetrator, the distinction makes sense only as a means
to insulate innocent enterprises from RICO liability. But the distinction
would also have the effect of denying to some victims the remedies af-
forded to other victims of identical conduct, depending solely upon the
relationship of the defendant to the enterprise.
If protection of innocent enterprises (and other innocent parties) is
the goal, the statutory addition to RICO of "appropriate standards of
derivative liability," another measure favored by the Task Force,170
would seem to be more tailored to that goal. Whether the enterprise is a
victim, an instrument or a perpetrator seems less relevant to the question
of what injury ought to be compensable than the question of whether the
enterprise ought to be liable at all, at least so far as treble damages are
concerned.
The grafting of the separate injury requirement on RICO originated
by analogy to the antitrust laws.' 7 ' But even where the RICO injury is
not limited to a competitive one, the analogy is misguided. The antitrust
laws were designed to discourage conduct which necessarily manifests
itself in a particular kind of injury.' 72 Though the mere formation of a
trust may violate laws, if such a trust produces no negative effect on com-
petition, there is no trust inflicted injury. Standing to sue under the anti-
trust laws must be based upon the injury which those laws were expressly
designed to prevent.
RICO is not focused on a particular kind of injury, but on conduct
which can, and does, result in different kinds of injuries. It is true that
RICO addresses the infiltration of an enterprise. But the statute also
169. Id.
170. Id. See infra notes 326-38 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
172. A trust is defined as "[a]n association or organization of persons or corporations hav-
ing the intention and power, or the tendency, to create a monopoly, control production, inter-
fere with the free course of trade or transportation, or to fix and regulate the supply and the
price of commodities." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 1352 (5th ed. 1979).
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addresses the conduct of an enterprise through racketeering activity, and
the variety of offenses which constitute racketeering suggests a variety of
injuries. All the injuries which result from a violation of section 1962 are
appropriate for compensation under the statute.
Indeed, the separate injury requirement, as applied to RICO, can
only have the anomalous effect, as the Sedima Court suggested, of deny-
ig a remedy to direct victims of racketeering activity while preserving it
for the indirect victims. 7 Should Congress wish to limit the private
civil RICO action to particular kinds of conduct, amendments should be
addressed not to injuries or plaintiffs but to the conduct itself.
2. Prior conviction and burden of proof
In declining to acknowledge any constitutional barrier that might
prevent 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), 74 as drafted, from ftmctioning as a private
attorney general measure, 175 the Supreme Court has saved those who
would maintain the present scope of the private remedy the relatively
minor trouble of redefining "racketeering activity" to refer to criminal
laws, as such.17 6 The Court has, in effect, corrected a relatively minor
defect in the statute while leaving to Congress the correction of that ma-
jor defect, "if defect it is," concerning the very scope of civil RICO.177
Congressman Boucher would supply that correction. H.R. 2943,178
introduced nine days after the Supreme Court decided Sedima, would
codify the court of appeals' prior conviction requirement, amending sec-
tion 1964(c) to read, in pertinent part:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
conduct in violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue any
person who engaged in that conduct and, with respect to such
conduct, was convicted of racketeering activity or of a violation
of section 1962 in any appropriate United States district court,
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
173. 105 S. Ct. at 3286 n.15.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
175. See supra text accompanying note 19.
176. Objections to proving criminal offenses in a civil suit, see infra notes 192-217 and ac-
companying text, could be answered by removing any reference to criminal laws and defining
each of the predicate acts that constitute "racketeering activity" as they are defined in the
various criminal laws. While this would prevent any taint of criminal conduct from resulting
from a civil suit, it would offer less protection to a defendant than does the current statute,
since without a requirement that acts be "indictable or chargeable," courts would be free to let
§ 1964(c) suits proceed on a lesser standard.
177. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985). See supra text accompa-
nying note 82.
178. See infra Appendix C for complete text.
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cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.179
This bill would effectively delete the private civil action from RICO.
In delineating the potential implications of the court of appeals' predicate
act conviction requirement, Justice White, writing for the Sedima Court,
recognized that such a requirement would arbitrarily limit the availabil-
ity of section 1964(c) actions."'0 The Court noted that lawbreakers are
not always caught, and even where convictions have been obtained, vic-
tims would be unlikely to recover for all the acts of racketeering activity
because convictions are rarely obtained for all the possible charges.'
Additionally, a criminal defendant might plea bargain to non-predicate-
act offenses or to a portion of the charges in order to limit or avoid civil
liability.182 The Court also noted that the civil litigants' dependence on
successful criminal 1rosecution might result in private pressures on pros-
ecutors as well as in self-serving trial testimony.183 The Court further
noted the problems that would occur when convictions were reversed on
appeal, and concluded that "the compelled wait for the completion of
criminal proceedings would result in pursuit of stale claims, complex
statute of limitations problems, or the wasteful splitting of actions, with
resultant claim and issue preclusion complications." ' 4
The bill proposed by Congressman Boucher would, if enacted, real-
ize all the problems foreseen by the Supreme Court. By narrowing the
area in which a section 1964(c) defendant must be found, H.R. 2943
would broaden the area into which a potential defendant could escape
section 1964(c)'s reach.
While H.R. 2943's prior conviction requirement would answer
many of the objections to RICO's breadth, it would do so by decimating
the private civil remedy. For those who believe that section 1964(c)
should be preserved as nothing more than a remedy for injuries sustained
as a result of criminal racketeering activity, the amendment offers some-
thing of a solution. Even so, as Justice White's criticism of the prior
conviction requirement suggests, its enforcement would prove arbitrary,
affording relief to some injured parties while denying it to others for the
sole reason that the person causing their injuries avoided the requisite
racketeering conviction. Indeed, any prior conviction requirement will
179. See infra Appendix C for complete text.
180. 105 S. Ct. at 3282 n.9.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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have this consequence, and the more narrowly focused the requirement,
the more arbitrary the result.
Perhaps as a compromise between the decimating effects of the prior
conviction requirement proposed in H.R. 2943 and the unacceptable
scope of section 1964(c) as it now stands, a requirement of a prior indict-
ment of at least one of the predicate acts is included in H.R. 2517's nar-
row definition of "pattern of criminal activity."18 H.R. 2517 defines
"pattern of criminal activity," in part, as "two or more acts... each of
which occurred not more than five years before the indictment is found,
or information is instituted, that names such acts as predicate criminal
activity."1 8
6
This proposal would avoid at least some of the problematic conse-
quences which Justice White foresaw in the prior conviction require-
ment. It would avoid, for example, the incentive for plea-bargaining to
non-predicate-act offenses as well as the incentive for self-serving trial
testimony. The proposal would also avoid the problems that arise when
all or some of the convictions are reversed on appeal, since the civil liabil-
ity would have long since attached.
While a prior indictment requirement would still arbitrarily deny
some injured plaintiffs a RICO remedy, this effect would be less than in
the case of a prior conviction requirement, since many more plaintiffs
would be able to obtain a remedy. And while such a requirement would
not confine section 1964(c) to proven criminal conduct, it would reduce
the incidence of commercial frauds being brought within the scope of
civil RICO by introducing the element of prosecutorial discretion that
Justice Marshall calls "[t]he only restraining influence on the 'inexorable
expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes.' "187
But the prior indictment requirement would give rise to possible
constitutional problems. Imposing liability upon a defendant on the ba-
sis of a mere indictment would subject the measure to due process and
equal protection challenges. To attach RICO liability to a defendant on
the basis of an indictment or information would be to impose a penalty-
the penalty of exposure to section 1964(c) liability-to which similarly
situated but unindicted persons would not be subjected. Judge Oakes,
185. See infra Appendix B. H.R. 2517 deletes the word "racketeer" and substitutes "crimi-
nal" throughout the statute. For a discussion of this measure, see infra notes 302-11 and
accompanying text.
186. H.R. 2517, infra Appendix B.
187. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3292, 3294 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 and American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co, v.
Haroco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291) (quoting United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Winter, J., dissenting in part)).
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writing for the court of appeals in Sedima, was concerned about the con-
stitutional implications of attaching liability for criminal conduct on less
than a reasonable doubt standard of proof. 8' The Supreme Court re-
sponded that it did "not view the statute as being so close to the constitu-
tional edge." '89 The imposition of liability with no proof at all might
carry the statute to that edge-and over it.190
The major objection to all variations of the prior conviction or prior
indictment requirement, however, remains that to whatever extent sec-
tion 1964(c) furnishes a deterrent to unlawful conduct, the deterrent ef-
fect would be lost in great measure by the imposition of such a
requirement. A person undeterred by RICO's severe criminal sanctions
would not likely be further deterred by additional civil sanctions. The
problem with the prior conviction requirement, like the separate injury
requirement, is that it seeks the reduction of perceived abuses through a
wholesale undirected reduction of accessibility to section 1964(c). These
suggested solutions do not address the problem. 19 1
The Sedima court of appeals imposed the prior conviction require-
ment in part because it believed that, since a RICO claim necessarily
entails proof of criminal conduct, the higher standard of proof appropri-
ate to criminal proceedings should be required for the predicate offenses.
The court reasoned that to require different standards of proof for differ-
ent elements of the cause of action would be impractical. 92 This argu-
ment did not persuade the Supreme Court, however, which stated that
"even if the stricter standard is applicable to a portion of the plaintiff's
proof, the resulting logistical difficulties, which are accepted in other con-
texts, would not be so great."'1
93
188. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
189. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3283.
190. This would be a first impression. As Professor Blakcy pointed out to the ABA Task
Force, "'there is no other civil remedy in Anglo-American jurisprudence that is tied to mere
indictment of a criminal charge.'" ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 222 n.343
(quoting Professor Blakey). The Task Force acknowledged that "[a]ttaching such punitive
civil consequences to mere indictment might well run afoul of the presumption of innocence in
our legal system." Id.
191. In the words of the NAAG/NDAA:
Requiring a prior criminal conviction ... would castrate the civil remedies available
... under RICO. Indeed, that is the not-too-well-hidden purpose of those who
recommend the criminal conviction limitation. It would turn RICO's promise of
remedial relief for victims of crime into a sham. Congress ought not to be a party to
that kind of legislative fraud.
NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 57.
192. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1984), affd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985).
193. 105 S. Ct. at 3283. The Court did not furnish examples. For contexts in which a
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Nor did the court of appeals' argument persuade the ABA Task
Force, which has recommended that RICO be amended to require a rea-
sonable doubt standard for proof of the commission of the predicate of-
fenses.194 Stating that "while private actions exist under other statutes,
e.g., the antitrust laws, which have parallel criminal provisions, none of
these statutes requires that as a prerequisite for recovery the plaintiff
must prove that crimes were committed by the defendants," '195 the ABA
Task Force found that RICO's "particularly stringent and onerous reme-
dies" 196 and "racketeer" stigma justify a "standard of proof more strict
than mere preponderance." '197 Noting actions in which juries determine
the existence of fraud by clear and convincing evidence and other ele-
ments of the claim by a preponderance, 19' the ABA Task Force con-
cluded by recommending that RICO be amended to require that the
predicate offenses be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite
to recovery under its civil provisions. 199
The ABA Task Force's argument for a higher standard than a pre-
ponderance, however, did not explain how it arrived at a reasonable
doubt standard. The RICO Cases Committee, agreeing that civil RICO's
"drastic injunctive remedies, treble damages, and attorneys' fees" war-
rant a higher standard of proof than a preponderance, nonetheless felt
that "since the civil suits did not threaten loss of life, incarceration, or
conviction of a crime," a reasonable doubt standard is "too severe." 2" A
minority of the RICO Cases Committee concurred, finding no justifica-
tion for the reasonable doubt standard in civil RICO cases.2°0 The RICO
Cases Committee stated that the reasonable doubt standard "should be
confined to the limited occasions that gave rise to it.""2 2 Accordingly,
higher standard of proof is applied to particular elements of a civil action, see infra notes 202-
03.
194. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 384.
195. Id. at 381 n.621.
196. Id. at 382.
197. Id. at 382-83.
198. Id. at 383-84.
199. Id. at 384. See infra notes 201-03.
200. COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 136, at 110-11.
201. Id. at 113.
202. Id. (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 327 (3d ed. 1942) ("Policy suggests
that ... [it] should be strictly confined to its original field and that there ought to be no
attempt to employ it in any civil case.")).
"It is sometimes said that, in general, whenever in a civil case a criminal act is charged as a
part of the case, the rule for criminal cases [ie., a reasonable doubt] should apply; but this has
been generally repudiated." 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 422 (Chadbourne rev. ed.
1981) (emphasis in original); see also cases cited id. § 2498, at 422-24 nn.2-12.
The Supreme Court declined to require a reasonable doubt standard to establish the ob-
scenity of a motion picture in a nuisance abatement action, declaring that "the Court has never
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the RICO Cases Committee recommended a "clear and convincing"
required the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard to be applied in a civil case." California v.
Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981). Justice Stevens pointed out, how-
ever, that the Court has "used the standard in several civil contexts." Id. at 97 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). These statements are not necessarily contradictory.
It is true that the Court has found the reasonable doubt standard appropriate in very
particular civil contexts. In Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S. 122 (1888), the Court upheld appli-
cation of a reasonable doubt standard to the invalidation of a land title by evidence of an oral
agreement. Id. at 134. The Court stated that "[ilt is only when an oral agreement is clearly
and satisfactorily proven by testimony above suspicion and beyond reasonable doubt, that it
will be enforced to establish rights in land at variance with the muniments of title.... ." Id. In
Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922), the Court upheld a workers' compensation law
against an equal protection claim, ruling that the general presumption "that a legislature un-
derstands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people" can only be overcome where it
is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the formulation chosen by the legislature
bears no relation to a legitimate interest. Id. at 521-22. In Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng.
Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934), the Court stated that "'the presumption of the validity
of the patent is such that the defense of invention by another must be established by the clear-
est proof-perhaps beyond reasonable doubt."' Id. at 8 (quoting Austin Machinery Co. v.
Buckeye Traction Ditcher Co., 13 F.2d 697, 700 (1926)). But the Court continued: "Through
all the verbal variances, however, there runs this common core of thought and truth, that one
otherwise an infringer who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy
burden of persuasion, and fails unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance."
Id.
More recently, the Court ruled that due process requires a reasonable doubt standard
during the adjudication stage of delinquency proceedings when a juvenile is charged with acts
that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, just as it does in a criminal proceeding
against an adult. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1969). The Court reasoned that:
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and
freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime
when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Id. at 363-64. But in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), an undivided Court refused to
require a reasonable doubt in a civil commitment proceeding, stating that:
There are significant reasons why different standards of proof are called for in
civil commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal prosecutions. In a civil com-
mitment state power is not exercised in a punitive sense. Unlike the delinquency
proceeding in Winship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to
a criminal prosecution. Cf. [Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385
U.S. 276, 284-85 (1966)].
In addition, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard historically has been re-
served for criminal cases. This unique standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in
the Constitution, is regarded as a critical part of the "moral force of the criminal
law," In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly
or casually in noncriminal cases.
,4ddington, 441 U.S. at 428.
In general, the reasonable doubt standard has been rejected in cases involving a statutory
penalty, a plea of truth to an action for a defamatory charge of crime, a plea of arson by the
insurer in an action on a fire insurance policy, disbarment proceedings, a paternity suit, a
proceeding for divorce or alienation of affections on the ground of adultery, and contempt
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standard as striking "an appropriate balance, protecting the rights of
civil defendants while allowing plaintiffs with strong proof of violations
successfully to prosecute their claims."2 03
proceedings. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 422-24 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1981), see
cases cited id. at 422-24 nn.4-12.
In civil RICO cases, the preponderance standard has been applied. In United States v.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), the court declined
to require a reasonable doubt standard for a civil injunction suit brought by the United States
under RICO's § 1964(a). Id. at 1356-57. The court found that:
[A]cts which may be prohibited by Congress may be made the subject of both crimi-
nal and civil proceedings, and the prosecuting arm of the government may be author-
ized to elect whether to bring a civil or criminal action, or both. A civil proceeding
to enjoin those acts is not rendered criminal in character by the fact that the acts also
are punishable as crimes.
Id. at 1357. The court noted other statutes in which "Congress has provided alternative civil
and criminal remedies.. ." concluding that "the standard of proof is lower in a civil proceed-
ing than it is in a criminal proceeding under any of the statutes we are considering." Id. Until
the court of appeals' decision in Sedima, every court that dealt with the issue rejected the
reasonable doubt standard for RICO civil actions. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10,
at 380. See, eg., Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675-77 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Farmers
Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
203. COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 136, at 110-11. In Herman & McClean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), the Court applied a preponderance standard to a civil case
involving allegations of securities fraud. Id. at 390-91. The Court found "the traditional use
of a higher burden of proof in civil fraud actions at common law" of "questionable perti-
nence." Id. at 388. The Court reasoned that:
A higher standard of proof apparently arose in courts of equity when the chan-
cellor faced claims that were unenforceable at law because of the Statute of Wills, the
Statute of Frauds, or the parol evidence rule. Concerned that claims would be
fabricated, the chancery courts imposed a more demanding standard of proof. The
higher standard subsequently received wide acceptance in equity proceedings to set
aside presumptively valid written instruments on account of fraud.... Maxwell
Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887) ("We take the general doctrine to be,
that when in a court of equity it is proposed to set aside, to annul or to correct a
written instrument for fraud or mistake in the execution of the instrument itself, the
testimony on which this is done must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and that
it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in
doubt."). Such proceedings bear little relationship to modern lawsuits under the fed-
eral securities laws.
Id. at 388 n.27 (citations omitted). Such proceedings bear equally little relationship to civil
RICO suits. The clear and convincing standard has been applied at common law in cases
involving a fraudulent pension application, a fraudulent patent, a false entry of homestead
land, rescission of an assignment, fraudulent inducement of an employment contract, income
tax fraud, election fraud, rescission of a deed or land contract, a fraudulent conveyance, fraud
in a marital property settlement, fraudulent representations in a salesman's contract, a fraudu-
lent deed of trust, fraud in obtaining release of an insurer, fraud in a sale and a note obtained
by fraud. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at 424-25 n.13 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1981).
The higher standard has also been used in cases involving allegations of undue influence, the
existence of a lost deed or will, a parol gift or agreement to devise or adopt, mutual mistake
sufficient for reformation of an instrument, a parol trust, an oral contract as a basis for specific
performance, a forged notary's certificate and the prior anticipatory use of an invention. See
id. § 2498, at 424-30. The higher standard of proof seems appropriate chiefly in cases where
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A RICO Cases Committee minority, however, argued for retention
of the preponderance standard.2" The minority noted federal and state
holdings that "[e]ven imposition of severe sanctions, including civil pen-
alties, may be... properly imposed on a showing of only a preponder-
ance" and the fact that "the underlying conduct may also be subject to
criminal sanctions ought not to make a difference."2 05
Pointing out that "[c]ivil RICO is explicitly remedial, not penal,"
20 6
the NAAG/NDAA also concluded that a preponderance standard is
appropriate:
When the purpose of a statute is penal and life and liberty inter-
ests are at stake, then the proof required for the government to
prevail must be beyond a reasonable doubt. When the interests
in issue are primarily pecuniary, then the higher standard is not
demanded, and the risk of error should be shared by the
parties.
207
In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,z°8 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that a clear and convincing standard may be appropriate "where
particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake. '2 0 9 The
Court provided as examples cases involving termination of parental
rights, involuntary commitment and deportation, stating that "[b]y con-
trast, imposition of even severe civil sanctions that do not implicate such
interests has been permitted after proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."'210 Thus, the NAAG/NDAA argued that the clear and convinc-
ing standard is appropriate where "more than a pecuniary interest" is at
stake-an interest bordering "on the vitality of life and liberty inter-
ests."21 The pecuniary interests implicated by section 1964(c), together
with the potential racketeer stigma, do not, in the view of the NAAG/
NDAA, "border on this vitality. '21 2 The NAAG/NDAA added that
"[fjor those parties fitting the definition of 'racketeer,' the legal label can
be no more stigmatizing than that of 'killer' for the defendant liable in a
the plaintiff seeks to overcome the evidence of a written instrument. This traditional use of the
higher standard in civil cases does not argue very persuasively for a higher standard applied to
civil RICO cases generally.
204. COMPREHENSIVE PERsPECTrVE, supra note 136, at 111-13.
205. Id. at 112.
206. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 94, at 60.
207. Id.
208. 459 U.S. 375 (1982).
209. Id. at 389.
210. Id. at 389-90.
211. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 63.
212. Id.
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wrongful death suit." '213
The MacLean Court upheld a preponderance standard in a civil case
alleging securities fraud,214 stating that such a standard permits the par-
ties to "share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion."21 The Court
reasoned that "[a]ny other standard expresses a preference for one side's
interests." '216 Thus the NAAG/NDAA concluded that:
Despite the "risk of opprobrium that may result from a finding
of fraudulent conduct," which a defendant faced, the
[MacLean] Court chose not to express a preference for either
side. Nor should this Committee. Between an alleged "RICO
perpetrator" and an alleged "RICO victim" how can Congress
put its thumb on the scales of justice in favor of the
perpetrator?
217
The defendant is not a "perpetrator," however, until he has been
proved so by the appropriate standard of proof. One might as easily ar-
gue that the reasonable doubt standard in criminal proceedings tips the
scales in favor of the "criminal," and quite heavily at that. The burden
of proof does not so much express a preference for one side or the other,
as it protects the party charged from injustice.
Additionally, even a preponderance standard tips the scales because,
in a tie, judgment favors the party who does not have to carry the burden
of proof. It might be said that wherever one party has the burden, the
law is expressing a preference for the interests of the other side. It is not
a question, then, of whether the scales ought to be tipped, but a question
of how much.
It may be appropriate for Congress to consider whether the interests
at stake in a section 1964(c) suit do, in fact, justify a higher burden of
proof for some elements of a RICO action. But in consideration of the
logistical difficulties of a variable standard and the extraordinary nature
of a standard higher than a preponderance in a civil suit, the evidence
favoring such a change should be clear and convincing.
3. Pattern of racketeering activity
Mere racketeering activity, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961,218 will
not give rise to RICO liability unless the racketeering acts are part of a
213. Id.
214. 459 U.S. at 387-91.
215. Id. at 390 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
216. Id.
217. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 62.
218. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West Supp. 1985).
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"pattern." Section 1961(5) states that a " 'pattern of racketeering activ-
ity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which oc-
curred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
'2 19
The courts have not always agreed on the meaning of "pattern."
Some courts have held that the "racketeering acts must have been con-
nected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to
constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts."22 0 Yet
other courts have held that the "statutory definition of pattern of racke-
teering activity is unambiguous and contains no reference to any require-
ment of 'relatedness,"' so long as the acts are connected to the conduct
of an enterprise.221
The Supreme Court was not directly presented with the pattern
question in Sedima and therefore did not decide the issue. The Court
strongly suggested in dictum, however, that two isolated acts "may not
be sufficient" to constitute a pattern.222 Relying on legislative history it
had dismissed in another context,223 the Court stated that:
The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts
of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Sen-
ate Report explained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not spo-
radic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally
requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of
continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity
plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." Signif-
icantly, in defining "pattern" in a later provision of the same
bill, Congress was more enlightening: "criminal conduct forms
a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events."22"
219. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
220. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
221. United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
222. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
224. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) and 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)
(1985)) (emphasis added by Court). Section 3575, "Increased sentence for dangerous special
offenders," was enacted as Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 992, of which RICO was Title IX. See supra note 5. The Sedima Court sug-
gested, therefore, that the "pattern" definition contained in section 3575(e) "may be useful in
interpreting other sections of the Act." 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. The definition focuses on the
"relationship" of the Acts to each other ("same or similar purposes, results," etc., and "not
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This suggestion stands in direct contrast to the Court's earlier statement
in United States v. Turkette225 that a pattern "is proved by evidence of
the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the partici-
pants in the enterprise.
' 226
Thus, while the Court has dealt unequivocally with the standing and
conviction requirements, it has not done so with the "pattern of racke-
teering activity." Unless Congress can provide a functional definition, the
definition of "pattern" may well become the battleground on which new
judicial wars over the scope of RICO are fought.227
isolated events"). Id. But the means of establishing a relationship are so broad, including
"same or similar... participants," that they exclude nothing. And in the event that anything
is omitted, a relationship can be established if the acts are "otherwise interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics." Id. If the "pattern" definition is to become the means of focusing
RICO on ongoing criminality, the "continuity" element must be emphasized.
225. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
226. Id. at 583.
227. Three recent decisions from the Northern District of Illinois may indicate what is in
store. The first extensive post-Sedima analysis of the pattern requirement appears in Northern
Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. I1. 1985). In Inryco, Judge
Shadur, relying on the pattern dicta of Sedima's footnote 14, see supra text accompanying
notes 222-23, declined to follow Seventh Circuit decisions that had held acts in furtherance of
a single criminal end sufficiently related to satisfy the "pattern" requirement. Inryco, 615 F.
Supp. at 831-33 (citing United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978)). The Inryco court reasoned
that:
True enough, "pattern" connotes similarity, hence the cases' proper emphasis on
relatedness of the constituant acts. But "pattern" also connotes a multiplicity of
events: Surely the continuity inherent in the term presumes repeated criminal activ-
ity, not merely repeated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a real
strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, implemented by several
fraudulent acts, as a "pattern of racketeering activity."
615 F. Supp. at 831 (emphasis in original). Thus, Judge Shadur concluded that a "single
scheme does not appear to represent the necessary 'pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at
833.
In Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Wearne Bros., No. 84-C-7970, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1985)
(available on WESTLAW, Feb. 20, 1986, DCT database), Chief Judge McGarr disagreed with
Judge Shadur's conclusion that a pattern requires acts in furtherance of more than a single
scheme:
In determining the meaning of a pattern of racketeering activity, this court is bound
to the language of the RICO statute. That act defines what a racketeering activity is.
The act does not suggest that a pattern of racketeering activity means a pattern of
fraudulent schemes; it merely requires a pattern of racketeering activity. [Sedima]
does not compel a contrary interpretation. Nothing in the language of Sedima sug-
gests that in order to find a pattern of racketeering activity, a pattern of fraudulent
schemes must be pled. Rather, [Sedima] only requires that the racketeering activity
be continuous and related.
Id. The court went on to rule that several acts of mail and wire fraud that "were related to one
another in furtherance of the alleged fraudulent scheme... satisfy the continuity plus relation.
ship standard of Sedima." Id.
In Graham v. Slaughter, No. 84-C-7881, (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 1985) (available on
WESTLAW, Feb. 20, 1986, DCT database), Judge Getzendanner disagreed with both deci-
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The ease with which a pattern of racketeering activity might be al-
leged in courts that require no more than the commission of two predi-
cate acts has doubtless contributed, for good or ill, to RICO's expansive
application. Indeed, the Sedima Court has stated that the "uses to which
civil RICO has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth
of the predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail, and
securities fraud, and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a
meaningful concept of "attern.' "228 If anything, the courts deciding
RICO issues have developed an overabundance of meaningful concepts.
By developing a more precise definition, the Ninety-ninth Congress may
produce a RICO statute that will function compatibly with its own legis-
lative intent. Equally important, it may reduce the confusion over
RICO's terms that has allowed the accessibility of section 1964(c) to de-
pend upon the interpretation preferred by a particular jurisdiction or
court.
Of the three bills currently being considered, only H.R. 2517 ad-
dresses the "pattern" issue. The bill would amend section 1961(5) to
read, in part:
(5) "pattern of criminal activity" means two or more acts
of predicate criminal activity, separate in time and place-
(C) that are interrelated by a common scheme, plan, or
motive, and are not isolated events ....229
sions. Noting that Inryco's apparent conclusion that multiple mailings in furtherance of a
single fraudulent scheme can never constitute a pattern of racketeering activity was rejected in
Trak Microcomputer, Judge Getzendanner stated that:
[This] court nonetheless agrees with Judge Shadur's analysis in [Inryco] that the
term "pattern" connotes not only a relatedness but a multiplicity of events: ...
Where this court differs with [Inryco] is in the implication that a single fraudulent
effort or episode should be equated with a single scheme....
To be "continuous," more than sporadic or isolated activity must be alleged. In
this court's view, that requires more than a single transaction but not necessarily more
than a single scheme.... In other words, while a RICO claim must involve different
criminal episodes, i.e., transactions "somewhat separated in time and place," [quot-
ing United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975)] an open-ended
scheme may include a sufficient number of independent criminal episodes to satisfy
the "continuity" factor of [Sedima].
Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
228. 105 S. Ct. at 3287 (emphasis added).
229. H.R. 2517, § 1961(5), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For complete text of H.R. 2517,
see infra Appendix B. H.R. 2517 substitutes the word "criminal" for "racketeer" throughout
the statute. RICO thus becomes CECE (Criminal Enterprises and Corruption of Enterprises).
This change also appears in the Model State Legislation of the ABA RICO Cases Committee:
See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. For a discussion of CECE, see infra notes 302-
11 and accompanying text.
Another proposed change shared by H.R. 2517 and the Model Legislation is the substitu-
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The "separate in time and place" language is apparently derived
from United States v..Moeller.230 In Moeller, the defendant was charged
with a criminal RICO violation stemming from predicate acts of arson
and kidnapping, both of which occurred on the same day at the same
business plant.231 The court was bound by precedent to rule that the
allegations made out a "pattern of racketeering activity. '232 But the
court stated:
Were the question open, I would have seriously doubted
whether the word "pattern" as used in § 1962(c) should be con-
strued to mean two acts occurring at the same place on the
same day in the course of the same criminal episode. While the
statutory definition makes clear that a pattern can consist of
only two acts, I would have thought the common sense inter-
pretation of the word "pattern" implies acts occurring in differ-
ent criminal episodes, episodes that are at least somewhat
separated in time and place yet still sufficiently related by pur-
pose to demonstrate a continuity of activity.
2 33
Despite the court's ruling, the decision has been cited for the proposition
that a "RICO claim must involve different criminal episodes, i.e., trans-
actions, 'somewhat separated in time and place.' "234
Separation "in time and place" would provide an easy test for the
facts in Moeller. But the absolute requirement stated in H.R. 2517, par-
ticularly with respect to separation in place, might provide unwanted im-
munity for some violators. It is conceivable that a single enterprise could
be conducted through a continuous series of acts constituting racketeer-
tion of the phrase "means two or more" for RICO's "requires at least two" in the definition of
"pattern of racketeering/criminal activity." The new phrasing will clarify the definition by
ensuring that two acts which meet the other requirements in the definition will always be
sufficient to constitute a pattern. This answers the uncertainty expressed in Sedima about the
current definition:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of racke-
teering activity" differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity," § 1961(5)... , not that it
"means" two such acts. The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they
may not be sufficient.
105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14 (emphasis added by Court). To the extent that the goals are clarity and
consistency of application, this much of H.R. 2517's definition ought to be adopted into
whatever definition of pattern emerges from the 99th Congress.
230. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
231. Id. at 57.
232. Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975)).
233. Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).
234. Graham v. Slaughter, No. 84-C-7881, (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 1985) (quoting Moeller, 402
F. Supp. at 58) (available Feb. 20, 1986, on WESTLAW, DCT database). See supra note 227.
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ing activity under RICO in every respect except that, because the acts
occur at the place of business of the enterprise, they are not separate in
time and place. Separation in place creates a wholly arbitrary distinc-
tion, and while separation in time may distinguish a "pattern" from an
isolated act, it does little, if anything, to narrow the meaning of
"pattern."
The "common scheme" language is derived from the "pattern" deft-
nition employed in United States v. Stofsky.235 In Stofsky, the defendant
was charged with violating section 1962 by committing several misde-
meanor violations of the Taft-Hartley Act 236 during a period of a year
and a half.237 The court believed that RICO's severe criminal sanctions
were not meant to be applied in circumstances involving isolated viola-
tions, and ruled that a "pattern" requires acts interrelated by a "common
scheme, plan or motive.
'238
But a common scheme requirement may defeat the "continuity of
activity" element of the pattern requirement by limiting a pattern to a
single scheme. As one post-Sedima court stated, in refusing to recognize
a pattern of racketeering activity in several fraudulent mailings to further
a single scheme, "[ilt merits observing that even if the three added kick-
back payments... involved the use of the mails, they still implemented
the same fraudulent scheme as the first two mailings-and the single
scheme does not appear to represent the necessary 'pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.' "239
235. 409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
236. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
STAT. 136 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
237. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614.
238. Id.
239. Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (emphasis in original); see supra note 227.
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "scheme" as:
A design or plan formed to accomplish some purpose; a system. Snider v. Leather-
wood, Tex. Civ. App., 49 S.W.2d 1107, 1110 [1932]. When used in a bad sense, term
corresponds with "trick" or "fraud". "Scheme to defraud" within meaning of mail
fraud statute is the intentional use of false or fraudulent representations for the pur-
pose of gaining a valuable undue advantage of working some injury to something of
value held by another. U.S. v. Mandel, D.C. Md., 415 F. Supp. 997, 1005 [1976].
Plan reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehen-
sion. U.S. v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 343 [1977].
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1206 (5th ed. 1979). The fact that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" may include acts within ten years of each other suggests that more than a single
scheme is contemplated. It would seem a rare "scheme to defraud," for example, that would
endure for so long a period. The only reasonable justification for the "pattern" requirement is
to encompass within RICO perpetrators engaged in a multiplicity of schemes-that is, in con-
tinuity of activity.
Additionally, the "common motive" element of the Stofsky definition renders the defini-
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The requirement of a relation between the acts was rejected by the
RICO Cases Committee,2" which stated:
Confining the statute's application to those patterns where a
direct relationship existed between each of the predicate of-
fenses would limit the application of RICO to a single offenses
pattern, including a narrow range of cognate or subservient of-
fenses. For example, it might only be possible to combine into
a single pattern drug offenses and violent or corruption of-
fenses, where the violence or corruption was used to advance
the drug activity. The committee felt that confining the statute
in this fashion would be unwise. Modern criminal organiza-
tions that are, in effect, conglomerates of crime involve in a
wide range of offenses; they should not be beyond the reach of
the statute.4a
In fact, the relationship of the acts to the actor should be sufficient to
supply the "relationship" element of a "pattern" without requiring the
acts to be related to each other. If a person continuously engages in simi-
lar conduct, a pattern emerges.
The time and place concept is found in the Model State RICO Leg-
islation (Model Legislation)242 prepared by the RICO Cases Committee.
The Model Legislation defines a pattern as:
(j) "Pattern of criminal activity" means two or more oc-
casions of conduct
(1) that:
(i) constitute criminal activity;
(ii) are related to the affairs of the enterprise;
(iii) are not isolated; and
(iv) are not so closely related to each other and
connected in point of time and place that
they constitute a single event.
243
The Model Legislation proposal would not prevent acts which occur
in the same place from constituting a pattern. Depending upon a court's
construction of "so closely related" and "so ... connected in point of
time and place," it is possible that this portion of the definition would do
little more than prevent a single occurrence involving multiple violations
tion wholly useless, at least in respect to economic crimes. Since such crimes share the com-
mon motive of economic gain, nothing would be excluded by the definition.
240. COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 120, at 36-37.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 16-178.
243. Id. at 29.
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from constituting a pattern. "Occasions of conduct that ... are not so
closely related to each other and connected in point of time and place
that they constitute a single event" are, more simply stated, acts that are
not so closely related to each other that they constitute a single event. The
additional language is unnecessarily confusing surplusage.
The RICO Cases Committee also decided, as stated in the commen-
tary, "to codify... that aspect of federal decisional law that holds that
the predicate offenses in a pattern of racketeering activity need only be
related to the enterprise and not to each other."2" But a relation "to the
affairs of the enterprise" is meaningless when read in light of the Model
Legislation's other provisions, particularly subparagraphs 6(b) and
6(c)(1),24 the Model Legislation's equivalent to RICO's subsections
1962(a) and 1962(b).24 6 Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the Model Legisla-
tion's paragraph 6 provide, in pertinent part:
(b) It is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of
criminal activity, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in, or control of, any enterprise or real property.
(c)(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any
proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of crimi-
nal activity in which he participated as a principal, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds, or any
proceeds derived from the investment or use of any of those
proceeds, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest,
or equity in, real property, or in the establishment or operation
of any enterprise.247
Under these subparagraphs, to the affairs of what enterprise must the
pattern of criminal activity be related? Criminal activity, or racketeering
activity in RICO, does not require an "enterprise." Only a pattern of
such activity used in conducting the affairs of or acquiring an interest in
an enterprise2 48 gives rise to RICO liability. But the criminal or racke-
teering activity itself, to say nothing of the pattern, need not be related to
the affairs of the enterprise in which the interest is being acquired. This
244. Id. at 36.
245. Id. at 64-65.
246. See supra note 12 for text of § 1962.
247. COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 120, at 364-65.
248. In the Model Legislation definition, an "enterprise" includes
any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other legal en-
tity, or any union, association, or group of persons, associated in fact although not a
legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as
other entities.
Model Legislation % 5(h), COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 29 (emphasis
added). For the RICO definition of enterprise, § 1961(4), see supra note 12.
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is particularly so in a violation of subparagraph (c)(1), where proceeds
from criminal activity are used to acquire an interest in the enterprise.
Surely the criminal activity contemplated by this subparagraph may be
entirely unrelated to the affairs of the enterprise in which the interest is
being acquired.
Alternatively, would the Model Legislation require proof that the
pattern of criminal activity that results in the acquisition of an interest in
one enterprise be related to the affairs of another enterprise? The com-
mentary offers no explanation for such a requirement, if that is what is
intended. The use of the phrase "the enterprise" suggests that only one
enterprise is contemplated, and that enterprise is the enterprise with re-
spect to which the violations are defined in paragraph 6. In subpara-
graphs 6(b) and 6(c)(1) or subsections 1962(a) and 1962(b), that
enterprise would be the enterprise invested in or acquired. For actions
involving these subparagraphs or subsections, the courts would be faced
with a brand new construction problem.
The problem arises because the enterprise requirement is incorpo-
rated in the definition of "pattern" though it is really a separate item. In
fact, the relationship that a "pattern of racketeering/criminal activity"
must have to an enterprise in order to constitute a violation of the statute
is defined in the Model Legislation's paragraph 6 and RICO's section
1962. Repeating the enterprise requirement in the definition of "pattern"
adds nothing that is not already in paragraph 6 and section 1962 except,
perhaps, confusion. 4 9
The NAAG/NDAA has offered a model statute of its own, which
includes a definition of pattern similar to that contained in the Model
Legislation. It would add to the current definition in section 1961(5) the
following language defining a pattern as two acts that:
(A) are related to the affairs of enterprise [sic],
(B) are not isolated; and
(C) are not so closely related to each other and connected in
point of time and place that, while having multiple bases of ju-
risdiction, including use of the mails, wire communications, or
interstate travel or transportation, they constitute a single
transaction involving only one victim not evincing continuity of
249. Ohio's little-RICO statute contains the following: "'PATTERN OF CORRUPT AC-
TIVITY' MEANS TWO OR MORE INCIDENTS OF CORRUPT ACTIVITY ... THAT
ARE RELATED TO THE AFFAIRS OF THE SAME ENTERPRISE .... " Act eff. Jan. 1,
1976, file 58, § 2923.31(E), 1985 Ohio Legis. Bull. 1227-34 (Anderson) (to be codified at OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.32(E) (emphasis added). This language would work with § 1962(a)-
(o), but would create the requirement of a second enterprise to which the racketeering activity
must be unrelated where the activity is not related to the affairs of the victimized enterprise.
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activity.25 °
It appears that what is intended by the NAAG/NDAA definition is two
acts, related to "the affairs of [the] enterprise, ' 25 ' that "are not isolated
[and] are not so closely related to each other [that] they constitute a sin-
gle transaction." The phrase "so . . . connected in point of time and
place," as in the Model Legislation definition, is surplusage and harmless
enough, though it provides an unwelcome opportunity for judges to lose
the meaning of the statute in the process of construction. The "enter-
prise" element is also identical to that in the Model Legislation defini-
tion, and is equally meaningless in its context. The remainder of the
language in this provision is sufficiently ambiguous to keep the federal
judiciary busy interpreting RICO for yet another fifteen years.
The phrase "while having multiple bases of jurisdiction, including
use of the mails, wire communications, or interstate travel or transpora-
tion" may be interpreted two ways. It may mean that two of these of-
fenses will not constitute a pattern if they are so closely related that they
are part of a single transaction. Alternatively, since the phrase modifies
"acts," it may be interpreted as a requirement of "multiple bases of juris-
diction" including at least one of the listed offenses. Obviously, the for-
mer is intended,25 2 in which case the language adds nothing at all to the
suggested definition, which already calls for more than a single
transaction.
By finding no pattern where the acts constitute "a single transaction
involving only one victim not evincing continuity of activity," the door is
left open for acts constituting a single transaction involving more than one
victim but not evincing continuity as well as a single transaction involving
only one victim evincing continuity of activity. Indeed, it may be difficult
to conceive of a single transaction involving only one victim evincing
continuity of activity. More troublesome is the "only one victim" lan-
guage, because a single transaction not evincing continuity but involving
more than one victim, such as partners or husband and wife, is perfectly
conceivable. This situation would always constitute a pattern under the
definition, because only transactions involving single victims are excluded.
250. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, exhibit E, at 2.
251. The phrase "affairs of enterprise" would make an interesting subject for interpretation,
but is probably the result of a typographical error. It is likely that "the enterprise," as in the
Model Legislation, see supra text accompanying note 243, or "an enterprise" is intended.
252. While there is considerable support for a "fraud plus" requirement that at least one
predicate act in a pattern of racketeering activity be an offense other than a fraud offense, see
infra notes 266-72 and accompanying text, this would be the first time anyone has proposed
that at least one predicate act be a fraud offense. The NAAG/NDAA opposes the "fraud
plus" requirement. NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 8.
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No reason for such a distinction has been advanced by anyone, nor is it
likely that such a result is intended here.2" 3
The NAAG/NDAA definition of "pattern" excludes acts that cont-
situte a single "transaction" where the Model Legislation excludes acts
constituting a single "event." The Model Legislation commentary states
that "[t]wo separate offenses that occurred as part of a single transaction
that amounted, in effect, to a single event would not fall within the stat-
ute, as it does under present federal law."2 4 This suggests that the
RICO Cases Committee's concepts of "a single event" and "a single
transaction" are closely related. Though these terms are not precisely
equivalent, they have an identical function in the "pattern" definitions in
which they appear: to focus on defendants engaged in repeated or con-
tinuous criminal activity. In commercial contexts, "transaction" may
have a more definite meaning than the somewhat vague "event." It is
therefore likely that "transaction" will encourage a more uniform appli-
cation. In noncommercial contexts, such as "any act or threat involving
murder," for example, "transaction" seems inappropriate. 25  If, how-
ever, the two terms are combined with other essential language of the
Model Legislation and NAAG/NDAA definitions, a reasonably useful
definition of "pattern" emerges:
(5) "Pattern of racketeering activity" means two or more acts
... that are not isolated nor so closely related to each other that
they constitute a single transaction or event.25 6
This definition contains the element of continuity of activity, because
that element is implicit in the requirement of multiple transactions or
events. The relationship between the acts is inherent in their relationship
to the common perpetrator, the person being sued. RICO would thus be
253. Still another possible interpretation: that the phrase "not evincing continuity of activ-
ity" modifies "victim." Under this interpretation, any two acts would form a pattern unless
they constitute a single transaction involving a single victim who is dead.
254. COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 134, at 36.
255. Black's Law Dictionary offers the following definitions:
Event. The consequence of anything; the issue or outcome of an action as finally
determined; that in which an action, operation, or series of operations, terminates.
BLACK'S LAW DICTmONARY 498 (5th ed. 1979).
Transaction. Act of transacting or conducting any business; negotiation; manage-
ment; proceeding; that which is done; an affair. It may involve selling, leasing, bor-
rowing, mortgaging or lending. Something which has taken place, whereby a cause
of action has arisen. It must therefore consist of an act or agreement, or several acts
or agreements having some connection with each other, in which more than one
person is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons between them-
selves are altered.
Id. at 1341.
256. The phrase "means two or more" is substituted for "requires at least two" for reasons
discussed supra note 229.
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limited to defendants who are engaged in repeated or ongoing criminal
activity and who, presumably, are unlikely to be deterred by lesser
sanctions.257
4. Fraud
It is widely conceded that the "commercial fraud"2 8 offenses are
not the sort normally associated with organized crime or racketeering. 5 9
In fact, they were not included in the early versions of RICO legislation.
Fraud in the sale of securities was added in response to evidence that the
Mafia was investing some of its vast funds in securities and engaging in
stock manipulation and other prohibited practices.2eo Mail and wire
fraud were added at the same time, though it is not quite certain why.26'
Though the commercial fraud offenses were added as something of
257. A simple solution to the "pattern" problem appears in Arizona's little-RICO statute:
Arizona has no "pattern" requirement at all. See Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301-17
(West 1978 & Supp. 1985). In fact, both the policies of deterring crime and of providing an
adequate remedy for injured persons support Arizona's solution. Why should 1964(c)'s reme-
dies be unavailable to a direct victim of racketeering activity?
258. The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are as follows:
§ 1341. Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away,
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or know-
ingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place
at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
§ 1343. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings,
signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or arti-
fice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
Id. § 1343.
259. This refers only to the common conception, which may or may not reflect reality. As
the ABA Task Force puts it, "[s]ecurities, mail and wire fraud are not traditional criminal
activities that one historically associates with the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, or other organized
criminal syndicates." ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 247. But see infra note
308.
260. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 99 n.130.
261. Id.
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an afterthought, they have been implicated in approximately ninety per-
cent of the reported section 1964(c) cases, with the vast majority relying
solely on those offenses.262 In the words of Justice Marshall, "[tihe single
most significant reason for the expansive use of civil RICO has been the
presence in the statute, as predicate acts, of mail and wire fraud
violations." '263
The ABA Task Force acknowledged that elimination of the fraud
predicate offenses from section 1961 would provide "a relatively uncom-
plicated solution to curbing Civil RICO's unwarranted overbreadth.
264
Just on the basis of statistical analysis, this approach would reduce by
ninety percent or more the claimed abuses of section 1964(c).265 On that
basis, it would also eliminate ninety percent of the cases which are not
perceived as abuses. Unlike the prior conviction and separate injury re-
quirements, however, elimination or modification of the predicate acts
least associated with the kinds of defendants RICO was expected to be
used against and most associated with the declared abuses may have
some analytical relationship to the desired result. It is not surprising,
therefore, that separate bills incorporating versions of this solution are
currently under consideration in the House and Senate.
H.R. 2517266 would introduce into RICO a so-called "fraud plus"
requirement, amending section 1961(5) to read, in part:
(5) "pattern of criminal activity' 267 means two or more
acts of predicate criminal activity ....
(B) all of which are not violations of the same provi-
sion of law, if that provision of law is-
(i) the second undesignated paragraph of sec-
262. Id. at 56. See infra note 272.
263. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
264. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 257. The Task Force discusses and
rejects this approach. Id. at 247-64. Egan has suggested the elimination of the frauds as a
basis for § 1964(c) suits. D. Egan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 102, at 3. Nathan recom-
mended a prior conviction requirement for the fraud offenses only. I. Nathan, Hearings on
RICO, supra note 89, at 6. This would virtually eliminate the frauds as a predicate act while
introducing into RICO all the potential problems associated with a prior conviction require-
ment. See supra text accompanying note 184. Another means of eliminating the fraud predi-
cate offenses, while appearing to preserve them, is the "fraud-plus" requirement that at least
one predicate act be other than a fraud offense. For a discussion of the fraud-plus provisions in
H.R. 2517 and S. 1521, see infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text.
265. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
266. See infra Appendix B for complete text.
267. For a discussion of the substitution of "criminal" for "racketeering," see infra notes
302-11 and accompanying text.
CONGRESS & CIVIL RICO
tion 2314 (relating to the transportation of stolen
goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent State tax
stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting) of this title;
(ii) section 1341 (relating to mail fraud) of this
title; or
(iii) section 1342 [sic] (relating to wire fraud) of
this title ....
It may be appropriate to distinguish fraud offenses from others,
since the general nature of the fraud offenses, which can include any mis-
statements transmitted by mail or telephone, is considered chiefly respon-
sible for bringing the so-called ordinary business disputes into the federal
court.2 69 Requiring a RICO claim to include at least one of the other
predicate offenses may at least come closer than the other proposals we
have examined to redirecting the RICO action without creating an arbi-
trary limitation. Congressman Conyers' bill, however, falls short of ac-
complishing this goal. Even ignoring the prior indictment requirement,
the bill as written fails in its apparent purpose while producing a wholly
arbitrary result. Since the bill would only prohibit actions based on vio-
lations of the same provision of law, it would not bar actions based on
mail fraud and wire fraud, which are separate provisions of law. Actions
based wholly on commercial frauds would remain subject to RICO pro-
vided at least one alleged false statement was made via the mails and one
by telephone. Such disputes often include both, in which cases the mea-
sure would have no effect on use of the commercial frauds. Plaintiffs in
other cases would be arbitrarily excluded because they could allege
fraudulent representations transmitted by only one or the other means.
Is fraud itself a less serious social concern, and therefore a less appropri-
ate subject of RICO's drastic sanctions and remedies, than is the use of a
single means of communication in its commission?
Moreover, the Conyers bill, by inserting the requirement in section
1961, would affect not only private citizens' access to section 1964(c) but
also governmental access to the entire range of RICO's criminal and civil
provisions. The United States Attorneys' guidelines for RICO prosecu-
tions already prevent RICO prosecutions for conduct seen as involving
nothing more than common law fraud.270 As noted earlier, claims of
abuse of the racketeering statute which have accompanied the wide-
268. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The correct citation for wire fraud is 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). For complete text of H.R. 2517, see infra Appendix B.
269. See, eg., Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293 (Marshall, J., dissenting) and supra text accompa-
nying note 263.
270. The United States Attorneys' Manual provides:
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spread litigation under secton 1964(c) by private plaintiffs have not ac-
companied the government's use of RICO's other provisions.
Governmental use of RICO's criminal and civil provisions would be se-
verely restricted by the new measure.
This result would be avoided by S. 1521, which would add a similar
limitation directly to section 1964(c). Under S. 1521, section 1964(c)
would contain the following provision:
(2) For purposes of this subsection, "pattern of racke-
teering activity" shall require that at least one act of racketeer-
ing activity shall be an act of racketeering activity other than-
(i) an act indictable under section 1341 [mail fraud]
of title 18, United States Code;
(ii) an act indictable under section 1343 [wire fraud]
of title 18, United States Code; or
(iii) an act which is an offense involving fraud in the
sale of securities.2 71
In requiring that one act of racketeering activity be an act other
than one of the "commercial fraud" offenses, this bill avoids the self de-
feating loophole in Representative Conyers' bill which would permit a
RICO claim where different fraud offenses can be alleged. The provision
in S. 1521 would probably accomplish its purpose of removing from civil
RICO liability all of the cases described as "commercial disputes." In
fact, though the "fraud plus" requirement is apparently conceived as a
compromise between the extreme positions of eliminating the commer-
cial fraud predicate offenses entirely and letting them stand unchanged, it
leans heavily toward satisfying the former position, since it is the rare
case in which fraud is alleged in conjunction with other offenses. 2
9-110.330 Charging RICO Counts
A RICO count of an indictment will not be charged where the predicate acts
consist solely and only of state offenses except in the following circumstances:
A. Cases where local law enforcement officials are unlikely to investigate and
prosecute otherwise meritorious cases in which the Federal Government has signifi-
cant interest;
B. Cases in which significant organized crime involvement exists; or
C. Cases in which the prosecution of significant political or governmental indi-
viduals may pose special problems for local prosecutors.
9-110.331 Commentary
The purpose of this guideline is to underscore the principle that prosecution of
state crimes, except in the circumstances set forth above, is primarily the responsibil-
ity of the state authorities.
U.S. ATORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110.330-.331 (Mar. 9, 1984).
271. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For complete text of S. 1521, see infra Appendix
D.
272. According to the ABA Task Force:
Approximately 44 percent of the cases for which the predicate offenses can be deter-
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Additionally, though direct amendment of 1964(c) avoids any limit-
ing influence on the government's use of RICO's other provisions, it does
not avoid limiting governmental use of section 1964(c) itself. In a case
now pznding, the Department of Justice is seeking to establish its author-
ity to sue for treble damages under section 1964(c)273 and has requested
that Congress write such authority into the statute itself.274 The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has already found section
1964(c) to be a useful tool. As the FDIC's Deputy General Counsel
Daniel W. Persinger stated:
The experience of the recent past has shown that individuals
are willing to engage in organized criminal activity involving
banks which goes far beyond what has been viewed by the
courts as "garden-variety fraud", "run-of-the-mill business dis-
putes" or "ordinary commercial litigation". Rather, such ille-
gal activity has been well organized and carried out on a
sustained basis, resulting in serious harm to the target institu-
tion. When such a case arises, the FDIC has a substantial eco-
nomic and legal interest in utilizing the benefits of the civil
RICO statute to (1) deter similar activity, (2) recoup financial
loss to the FDIC's insurance fund as well as to the bank's credi-
tors and shareholders, and (3) establish important legal prece-
dents to help proscribe future illegal activity.27
Stating that "[t]he vast majority of FDIC-insured commercial banks sim-
ply do not have the financial resources or the expertise to protect them-
selves from organized criminal activity and fraud,"276 Persinger
suggested that Congress include 18 U.S.C. § 1344, bank fraud, among
mined from the opinion appear to rely solely on allegations of mail or wire fraud.
Another 13 percent rely primarily on mail or wire fraud, but also alleged another
predicate offense. Twelve percent focus on another predicate offense, but also alleged
mail or wire fraud violations. Approximately 35 percent rely solely or primarily on
allegations of securities fraud.
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 57. It is not entirely clear whether securities
fraud is considered as "another predicate offense" alleged in conjunction with mail or wire
fraud for the purposes of the Task Force's analysis. Presumably, it is; otherwise, the cases
documented would seem to add up to something approaching 104%, less some overlap. In
that case, even some of the 13% described as alleging another predicate offense are based solely
on commercial fraud. In any event, the "fraud plus" would probably have prevented more
than half of the § 1964(c) actions from being filed.
273. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
274. J. Keeney, Hearings on RICO, supra note 22, at 14.
275. D. Persinger, Hearings on RICO, supra note 137, at 6-7.
276. Id. at 10. According to Persinger, "[n]inety-seven percent of these banks have assets of
less than $500 million, eighty-four percent have assets of less than $100 million and sixty-six
percent have assets of less than $50 million." Id. Persinger did not offer to explain how these
figures reflect a lack of financial resources.
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the predicate offenses.2 77
State278 and local governments have also been beneficiaries of sec-
277. Id. at 11-12. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982), Bank fraud, provides in part:
(a) Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice-
(1) to defraud a federally chartered or insured financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities or other prop-
erty owned by or under the custody or control of a federally chartered or in-
sured financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
Persinger futher stated:
While the Attorney General may bring a civil action to enjoin a violation of the bank
fraud statute, just as in the case of mail or wire fraud, there is no provision in RICO
denominating bank fraud a "predicate act", as there is in the case of mail or wire
fraud. We believe bank fraud should be so denominated, thus allowing a private
right of action for treble damages where such fraud amounts to a pattern of racke-
teering. Given the concern shown by Congress over the effect of bank fraud on the
Nation's federally chartered and federally insured institutions, an amendment to
RICO is a sensible extension of the intent to make bank fraud a federal crime.
D. Persinger, Hearings on RICO, supra note 137, at 11-12. The RICO Cases Committee re-
ported that:
In the 1980-81 period, the failure of 105 banks and savings and loan associations cost
$1 billion. Roughly one half of the bank failures and one-quarter of the savings and
loan failures had as a "major contributing factor" criminal activity by insiders. Fail-
ures that have occurred since are expected to add another $1 billion to the total.
COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 44-45 (citing Committee on Government
Operations, Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct and Insider Abuse in the Nation's Finan-
cial Institutions, H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984)). H.R. RnP. No. 1137
notes:
Despite such enormous losses, neither the banking nor the criminal justice systems
impose effective sanctions or punishment to deter white-collar bank fraud. The few
insiders who are singled out for civil sanctions by the banking agencies are usually
either fined de minimis amounts or simply urged to resign. The few who are crimi-
nally prosecuted usually serve little, if any, time in prison for thefts that often cost
millions of dollars.
Id. at 5, quoted in COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 45 n.40.
Though the American Bankers Association has come out squarely in favor of measures
that would limit the use of RICO's civil remedies, particularly with respect to the fraud of-
fenses, it would seem that its members have much to gain from § 1964(c).
278. For example, Steven W. Hamm, Administrator, South Carolina Department of Con-
sumer Affairs, testified:
The Department of Consumer Affairs, on behalf of the State of South Carolina
and its citizens, is presently in federal court for the District of South Carolina as a
plaintiff against, among others, a major second mortgage lender in a multi-million
dollar lawsuit seeking to protect between 1200 and 2000 of my state's consumers....
Had we not had the RICO statute available to us, as it now exists, not only would we
be powerless to recover financial losses for our consumers, our litigation would have
been hopelessly and almost inextricably tied up in the bankruptcy court several states
away. Such a result would make it almost impossible for the consumers involved,
most of whom have serious financial problems, or are educationally disadvantaged,
even to exert their claims.
Our case involves a secondary mortgage money lender who we contend took a
"hit and run" approach to South Carolina and our citizens. People with bad credit
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tion 1964(c). Indeed, fears that pre-Sedima judicial limitations of
RICO's scope, contrived to meet the problems associated with private
section 1964(c) actions, would limit local governments' successful use of
RICO in confronting "the persistent challenges and dangers, as well as
the corrupting influence, posed by systematic criminal frauds,"27 9
prompted the cities of New York, Chicago and Philadelphia to file ami-
cus briefs to the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.2"' and
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.2" I The cities stated
that they
have found that the civil remedy provision in [RICO] is an ef-
fective weapon for deterring... various criminal schemes and
protecting the public interest .... Specifically, the Cities have
employed the civil remedy provision in RICO to attack fraudu-
lent tax evasion, bribery and illegal bidding schemes .... In
City of New York v. Liberman, the City of New York sued its
former chief lease negotiator due to his participation in a
scheme to defraud the City in connection with the City's leases
of various properties .... In City of New York v. Bandolene
Fuels, Inc., New York sued a fuel oil company and its principal
officer for the damages flowing from a fraudulent bidding and
overbilling scheme .... In City of Philadelphia v. Modern
Transportation, Inc., the City of Philadelphia sued eleven cor-
problems were sought out by this company and loans were extended to them with
unbelievably excessive "discount points," "origination fees," or interest rates. Dis-
closure was, to say the least, inadequate.
We found consumers whose loans had been sold to more than one investor and
consumers who could get no consistent payoff figure on their mortgage because no
one knew the "real" terms of the loan .... In perhaps the most shocking scenario,
we found consumers whose loan proceeds checks bounced, even though the mortgage
for the loan was on their property and the defendant company sold or assigned the
mortgage to an institutional investor knowing it had never made the proceeds checks
good and, therefore, no loan even existed.
The company in question was a well-greased tube-none of the assets "stuck"
but were rather channeled to other pockets-either individual pockets or those of the
40 or 50 odd corporate alter egos of the defendant corporation.... Without RICO
as it stands, [South Carolinian consumers] are virtually powerless to improve their
lot-they need the ability to pursue legal action aggressively, effectively and quickly.
Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 29, 1985) (statement of Steven W. Hamm,
Administrator of the S.C. Dep't of Consumer Affairs) (official government printing not yet
available; cited from text of prepared statement, at 1-4).
279. Brief of amicus curiae for respondent, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985) (available Sept. 19, 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
280. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
281. 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
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porations due to their participation in an intricate scheme to
defraud the City in connection with sludge removal contracts
.... Civil RICO actions have also been employed by or on
behalf of state or other local governments to recover the loss
flowing from complex and farreaching frauds, often accompa-
nied by bribery or some other form of corruption.
28 2
The cities' presentation shows civil RICO functioning in a manner
that might have been sanctioned even by the enacting Congress.
Although the brief was directed at the particular issues addressed by the
Sedima Court, the implications bear on any limitation that will deprive
the cities of this remedy. The limitations on the fraud offenses proposed
in S. 1521 would do just that.
The claims of abuse that have been directed toward the private use
of section 1964(c) have not accompanied governmental use of the provi-
sion. It is doubtful whether the result of denying such use was intended,
and even more doubtful whether such a result would be acceptable to
Congress in the face of uncontroverted testimony that the provision has
served or promises to serve as a valuable tool for governments at all
levels.
This omission might easily be remedied by a special provision for
governmental use of the commercial frauds, leaving the question of
whether RICO is appropriately directed at private suits for fraud. Put-
ting aside for the moment the question of "commercial disputes," it has
been argued that section 1964(c) has seen significant duty, if not against
the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra, at least against organized criminality in
suits by private parties alleging fraud. Such legitimate uses of the statute
should be preserved, reflecting, as they do, a successful accomplishment
of the statute's purpose.
In an appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Daniel H.
Bookin urged the retention of the fraud offenses and the inclusion of
credit card fraud as well.2" 3 He recounted how VISA and MasterCard
have successfully used section 1964(c) to fight credit card fraud schemes
282. Brief of amicus curiae for respondent, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985) (available Sept. 19 1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file) (citing City of Philadel-
phia v. Modem Trans., Inc., 85 Civ. 2052 (E.D. Pa. settled Feb. 13, 1985); City of New York
v. Bandolene Fuels, Inc., 81 Civ. 1240 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 24, 1981); City of New York v.
Liberman, Index no. 40339/85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 8, 1985)).
283. Hearings on RICO Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1985) (statement of Daniel H. Bookin, appearing on
behalf of VISA and MasterCard) (official government printing not yet available; cited from
text of prepared statement, at 2-11) [hereinafter cited as D. Bookin, Hearings on RICO].
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involving millions of dollars and thousands of victims.2 84 He cited VISA
v. Drisang285 to illustrate the importance of RICO in deterring such
fraud:
[The defendants] tricked cardholders into disclosing their ac-
count numbers over the telephone by various methods, includ-
ing statements or suggestions that defendants were somehow
affiliated with MasterCard and VISA.... The defendant then
manufactured and deposited VISA and MasterCard charge
slips for transactions that never occurred, and the cardholder
was billed for a charge that was never authorized.
After the fraud was discovered, the defendants moved on
to another bank, often using new corporate names, but follow-
ing the same scheme....
The defendants' fraudulent activities caused untold losses,
inconvenience and emotional distress to more than 15,000 con-
sumers around the country who either paid for charges they
never authorized or were forced to go through the time-con-
suming efforts necessary to remove unauthorized charges from
their accounts....
... The defendants used or attempted to use credit card
merchant bank accounts in Hawaii, California, Wyoming,
Utah, Georgia, Florida and Pennsylvania. At the time of our
lawsuit, key witnesses and defendants were spread throughout
the country. It was only through RICO and the resulting avail-
ability of the federal courts and nationwide service of process
and subpoena power that we were able to bring an effective law-
suit. By its nature, RICO allows the bringing of a lawsuit that
presents a full picture of a criminal enterprise, in contrast to a
state court fraud action encompassing only a segment of the
overall scheme.286
Cases such as Drisang seem to involve organized criminality appro-
priately brought within RICO's scope. Yet they probably fall within the
classification of "fraud not related to securities or business transactions,"
which, according to the ABA Task Force, comprises but three percent of
284. Id.
285. No. 85-2627 PAR (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 23, 1985), cited in D. Bookin, Hearings on
RICO, supra note 283, at 6.
286. D. Bookin, Hearings on RICO, supra note 283, at 7-9 (citing Drisang).
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the reported section 1964(c) decisions.287 Even if such uses of section
1964(c) are proper, they cannot justify a statute for which seventy-seven
percent of such decisions involve "securities fraud [and] common law
fraud in a commercial or business setting,"2 88 unless those uses, the vast
majority of civil cases brought under the statute, are proper as well.
In addressing the question of whether business fraud is an appropri-
ate subject for section 1964(c), the ABA Task Force took the position
that it will take no position:
We did not, however, consider it our charge to determine
whether policy considerations wholly apart from those consid-
ered by Congress in 1970-e.g., the need to attack fraud in the
national economy-justify a statute of Civil RICO's breadth.
We believe that even if such alternative policy considerations
would eventually yield a statute like Civil RICO, it is essential
that Congress consider those matters before such a statute is
allowed to stand as federal policy.2 89
The ABA Task Force "tried to view the policy considerations Con-
gress addressed when the statute was passed."29 That has proved to be a
futile task, considering the broad disagreement over what those policy
considerations were, to say nothing of whether those policy considera-
tions in fact embrace the uses to which section 1964(c) has been put.
291
In the words of Phillip A. Feigin, "the questions of what Congress meant
and intended in 1970 should be secondary to considerations of what
RICO should mean in 1985 and beyond." '292 Since virtually all use of
section 1964(c) and all the attendant controversy involve the fraud of-
fenses, "the need to attack fraud in the national economy" is precisely
the matter that Congress is, in effect, considering as it ponders the future
scope of the private civil remedy.
Among the matters which Congress has been invited to consider is
the ineffectiveness of traditional remedies in confronting the not insignifi-
cant problem of fraud. Estimates of the direct economic cost of fraud in
the national marketplace range from about $80 billion to well over $100
billion per year.2 93 This exceeds the $70 billion to $80 billion estimated
287. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 55-56. See supra note 24.
288. Id.
289. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 n.49 (emphasis in original).
290. Id. at 46.
291. See supra notes 5, 20 & 24.
292. P. Feigin, Hearings on RICO, supra note 137, at 5.
293. In 1974, the United States Chamber of Commerce analyzed the estimated costs of
white-collar crime, in billions of dollars:
May 1986] CONGRESS & CIVIL RICO
cost of antitrust violations,2 94 which long have been considered a suitable
subject for precisely the remedies that section 1964(c) provides victims of
RICO violations.2 95 And it may be that fraud produces additional costs
not included in the estimates. In the words of Miriam S. Saxon:
Several white collar crime authorities... have noted that
Bankruptcy Fraud $ 0.08
Bribery, Kickbacks, and Payoffs 3.00
Computer-Related Crime 0.10
Consumer Fraud, Illegal
Competition, Deceptive
Practices (excluding price-
fixing and industrial espionage) 21.00
Consumer victims: $ 5.5
Business victims: 3.5
Government revenue loss: 12.0
Credit Card and Check Fraud 1.10
Credit Card: 0.1
Check: 1.0
Embezzlement and Pilferage 7.00
Embezzlement (cash,
goods, services): 3.0
Pilferage: 4.0
Insurance Fraud 2.00
Insurer victims: 1.5
Policyholder victims: 0.5
Receiving Stolen Property 3.50
Securities Thefts and Frauds 4.00
TOTAL (billions) = $41.78
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S. OF AM., A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
EVERYONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S Loss 6 (1974). The Chamber appeared before Congress
in 1985 to testify that "the problem" with civil RICO "lies with the indiscriminate use of [mail
fraud, wire fraud or securities fraud as predicate offenses] by private parties to further their
self-interest." R. Middleton, Hearings on RICO, supra note 90, at 4.
The RICO Cases Committee estimates that, in view of the inflation rate, the forty billion
dollar figure given by the Chamber of Commerce in 1974 could probably be doubled today.
COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 42. Moreover, the RICO Cases Commit-
tee pointed out that the Chamber's study "did not include those anti-trust violations that in-
volve fraud; in 1968, antitrust violations generally were estimated to cost $35 to 40 billion."
Id. at 43 (citing SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D
SESS., WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 10 (Comm.
Print 1978)). The RICO Cases Committee added that "[t]hat figure, too, could probably be
doubled today." Id. at 43. Add to that the estimated $2.5 to $25 billion cost of fraud against
the government each year. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES
CAN, AND SHOULD, Do MORE TO COMBAT FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 7-12
(1978)).
There are indications that the Chamber of Commerce estimates may be conservative. The
American Insurance Association estimates that fraudulent insurance claims may exceed $11
billion per year. Id. at 44 (citing N.Y. Times, July 6, 1980, § -, at 17, col. 1). It will take
more than inflation to account for the difference between that figure and the $1.5 billion esti-
mate in the 1974 Chamber study.
294. See supra note 293.
295. See supra note 41.
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perhaps even more damaging than the monetary costs to soci-
ety of white collar crimes are the broader social consequences
of crimes and illegal actions committed by individuals of high
social standing and responsibility.... It has been argued that
... the American social and economic system is undermined
when some of our political and economic leaders disregard the
laws they advocate for others. Such violations may create cyni-
cism and an attitude of "if others are doing it, I will too." ...
And although research in this area is limited, it has been argued
that such destruction of faith in our legal system promotes an
atmosphere of lawlessness, leading to more crime. It is further
argued that deceptive and fraudulent practices by some busi-
nessmen may tend to force others to engage in similar practices
in order to remain competitive, and thus the crediblity of the
commercial market is threatened.
2 96
Accordingly, Herbert Edelhertz has observed:
White-collar crime, like common crime, can have a serious
influence on the social fabric, and on the freedom of commer-
cial and interpersonal transactions. Every stock market fraud
lessens confidence in the securities market. Every commercial
bribe or kickback debases the level of business competition,
often forcing other suppliers to join in the practice if they are to
survive.
297
By recommending that the fraud offenses be included in state legis-
lation, the RICO Cases Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice Section
decided to rush in where the Section of Corporation, Banking and Busi-
ness Law Task Force fears to tread.2 98 The RICO Cases Committee took
the position that:
[F]raud is no minor matter to the people of the nation or to
their businesses. It can hardly be argued that current law has
curtailed it adequately. In short, if anything can be done to
affect the incentive structure of commercial and other forms of
criminal fraud, it would be to the advantage of all. New legal
remedies must be developed that are, in an appropriate combi-
296. M. SAXON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., REP. No. 80-84 EPW, WHITE COL-
LAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 11-12 (1980).
297. H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT, AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 6-9 (1970), quoted in NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 42-43.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 289-92.
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nation, swift, sure, and severe.299
RICO itself "promises that combination with its careful blend of public
and private criminal and civil sanctions. ' '3""
Acknowledging that the criminal justice system lacks sufficient re-
sources to combat crime effectively, Steven Twist stated that:
We must not take from the citizens their only effective resource
for protection against fraud and racketeering and at the same
time acknowledge our own inability to protect them. To do so
would subject a predictably large number of Americans to vic-
timization without remedy.01
That virtually all the testimony advocating the effective repeal of
section 1964(c) has been proffered by representatives of the very indus-
tries most frequently required to defend section 1964(c) suits predicated
on fraud suggests either that fraud is so common a practice in those in-
dustries that any measure which threatens fraudfeasors threatens those
industries themselves, or that the ease with which fraud can be alleged in
any business dispute combined with the deep pocket of many members of
those industries makes them ready victims of abuse of the statute. Those
who accept the former alternative must weigh such testimony accord-
ingly. Preferring the second alternative, however, leads one to conclude
that all will benefit from a statute offering protection against victimiza-
tion by fraud while providing sufficient protection against abuse of its
provisions. For this reason, Congress must consider measures aimed at
eliminating the abuse, not the remedy.
5. Additional measures to discourage abuse
In whatever form RICO emerges from the Ninety-ninth Congress,
efforts to minimize abuse of the statute should be welcome. H.R. 2517's
amendments of section 1962 seem directed to this end. The bill would
amend section 1962 to read, in part:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any
299. COMPRHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 47 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2 (2d ed. 1977)).
300. Id. The Committee said further that "[tihe model legislation promises that combina-
tion." Id.
301. S. Twist, Hearings on RICO, supra note 122, at 20. As Twist concluded:
To retreat now from the full force of RICO would be an act of great irresponsi-
bility, would signal a new era of uncontrolled fraud, and would break faith with the
American people who have been promised and who deserve the best legal weapons
available to fight racketeering and white collar crime and to preserve and protect our
free market.
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income... from a pattern of criminal activity.., knowingly to
use or invest... such income, in acquisition of any interest in
... any enterprise ....
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
criminal activity... knowingly to acquire or mainin... any
interest in or control of any enterprise ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise... knowingly to conduct or partici-
pate.., in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of criminal activity .... 3o2
The two changes in this section are the substitution of the word "crimi-
nal" for "racketeering" (a substitution that would be imposed through-
out the statute) and the requirement that the conduct prohibited by
section 1962 be "knowingly" violated.
The substitution of "criminal" for "racketeering" throughout the
statute is an apparent response to the criticism that the "racketeer" label
is a primary factor in inducing defendants to settle RICO claims whether
or not the claims have merit. 33 As noted, the ABA survey of attorneys
with RICO experience not only failed to substantiate this claim but
seemed to indicate that the "racketeer" charge in a civil suit causes de-
fendants to become more intransigent. 3" Either way, the "racketeer"
label is unwelcome. A measure that discourages early settlement of a
proper action is no more desirable than one that encourages a strike suit.
No strong policy considerations have been advanced for keeping the
"racketeer" language.3 05 Attorney General Celebrezze of Ohio suggested
302. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (emphasis added). For complete text of H.R.
2517, see infra Appendix B.
303. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
305. But the NAAG/NDAA argued that:
If the suggestion of those who would take "racketeering" out of RICO were carried
to its logical conclusion, the Congress should also rename federally cognizable "mur-
der," "rape," and "robbery" with less pejorative terms. These people have forgotten
the proper role of social opprobrium in the administration of justice, criminal and
civil. See, eg., J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving 98, 100-05, 115-16 (1970) ("At its
best, in civilized and democratic countries, punishment surely expresses the commu-
nity's strong disapproval of what the criminal did. Indeed, it can be said that punish-
ment expresses the judgment (as distinct from any emotion) of the community that
what the criminal did was wrong.") (emphasis in original); II J. Stephen, A History of
the CriminalLaw of England 81-82 (1883) ("[The sentence of the law is to the moral
sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax .... In
short, the infliction of punishment by law gives definite expression... to... the
moral or popular... part of morality."). On the role of euphemisms in encouraging
public and official reluctance to enforce the law and providing rationalizations for the
violators themselves in the "white-collar crime" area, see Task Force Report: Crime
and Its Impact-An Assessment: Task Force on Assessment, President's Commission
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that "racketeering" appropriately defines the conduct of those who vio-
late the statute.3" 6 The Justice Department suggested that the term pro-
vides a useful shorthand that federal courts have become accustomed to,
and that it would be difficult to find a less pejorative reference.30 7 They
find "criminal" too general. The desire to have just the right word, how-
ever, does not outweigh the prejudicial consequences may result from the
widely shared emotional reaction to the word "racketeer."30 8
The word usually offered as a substitute for "racketeer" is "crimi-
nal." "Criminal," in fact, appears in the Model Legislation309 as well as
in H.R. 2517.310 Those who object to being called "racketeers" seem
content to be known as "criminals." Though the term "criminal" is a
general one, it, too, appropriately defines the conduct of those who vio-
late the statute. Though it would be a shame to sacrifice as inspired an
acronym as "RICO,"3"' better the acronym than the statute's substantive
provisions.
The "knowingly" requirement, however, may have a very real effect
on the burden of proof which must be borne in civil suits, as well as in
criminal prosecutions. Dominic P. Gentile welcomed the additional bur-
den, suggesting that in the absence of a scienter requirement in section
1962, the prohibitions of the section impose strict liability.312 Recogniz-
ing the element of intent inherent in the predicate acts, Gentile pointed
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 104-08 (1967) ("Most white col-
lar crime is not at all morally neutral"); D. Cressey, Other People's Money 102 (1952)
(that embezzlers rationalize their conduct as different from theft is important factor
in behavior pattern).
NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 11-12. But the NAAG/NDAA recog-
nized that "Civil RICO is explicitly remedial, not penal." Id. at 60. No one disputes the
suitability of the "racketeer" language to criminal RICO. The NAAG/NDAA argument
seems less applicable to § 1964(c) with its appropriately lower burden of proof than to the
criminal provisions of § 1963.
306. A. Celebrezze, Hearings on RICO, supra note 167, at 5.
307. J. Keeney, Hearings on RICO, supra note 22, at 41.
308. The NAAG/NDAA argued that "racketeer" is indeed the right word:
The dictionary... defines a "racket" as a "business run by fraud or extortion" and a
"racketeer" as one who runs a "racket." American Heritage Dictionary, 580 (Dell.
ed. 1970). If "legitimate" business people violate RICO's terms, they ought to be
called "racketeers." No justification can be offered for limiting the term "racket-
eer"-or RICO-to those whose names end in vowels.
NAAG/NDAA, Hearings on RICO, supra note 104, at 10.
309. COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 135, at 25-29.
310. See infra Appendix B for full text of H.R. 2517.
311. In the classic 1930 gangster movie, "Little Caesar," Edward G. Robinson played un-.
derworld czar Caesar Enrico Bandello, known as "Rico." G. Robert Blakey "will neither
admit nor deny" that this had anything to do with the title of the statute. Blakey, supra note 5,
at 237 n.3.
312. D. Gentile, Hearings on RICO, supra note 141, at 9.
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out that "when the civil treble damage remedy is imposed it is not im-
posed for the [predicate act] itself but for the 'pattern of racketeering
activity.' "313 He stated that strict liability "[i]n the context of the civil
remedy.., is abhorrent and contrary to the usual elements necessary to
impose criminal liability for the predicate acts which are the foundation
for the civil remedy. These traditional elements require both an evil
mind ('knowingly') and an evil act." '14 He concluded, therefore, that
"the provision of 18 U.S.C. 1962(a), (b), and (c) should be modified so as
to make it clear that the perpetrator of the [predicate act] must not only
intend the [predicate act] itself, but also intend to be acting 'in a
pattern'. 315
The Justice Department argued that, as scienter is already required
to be proved in connection with the commission of the predicate acts, the
additional scienter requirement is unnecessary and would only confuse
juries in already complex cases. 16 Indeed, by imposing the additional
element to be proved, the measure would permit defendants to escape
conviction in cases where commission of the predicate acts and infiltra-
tion were proved. The benefit obtained by the additional element may
well be outweighed by the additional burden this would impose on prose-
cutors who must already prove intent to commit the underlying offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Civil plaintiffs, however, are subject to neither the self-imposed re-
straint which guides the Justice Department nor the reasonable doubt
standard that all but assures that a convicted criminal defendant commit-
ted predicate offenses that rise to the level of criminal conduct.317 Addi-
tional protection for a civil defendant might be secured by inserting the
scienter requirement directly into section 1964(c) instead of into section
1962 where it appears in Representative Conyers' bill, H.R. 2517.318
This would produce the unusual result of demanding a greater burden of
proof in civil suits than in criminal prosecutions, an effect that would be
felt in section 1964(c) suits instituted by the Justice Department, already
presumably guided by the same principles of "prosecutorial restraint"
applied in criminal prosecutions.319
Perhaps the result aimed at by the Conyers measure might be
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. J. Keeney, Hearings on RICO, supra note 22, at 50.
317. For the guidelines for RICO prosecutions in the United States Attorneys' Manual, see
supra note 270.
318. See infra Appendix B for full text of H.R. 2517.
319. U.S. ATroRNEYs' MANUAL § 9-110.330-.331 (Mar. 9, 1984).
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achieved indirectly by a proposal made before Congress by Donald E.
Egan, who viewed the vagueness of section 1962(c)'s terms as a particu-
lar source of abuse.320 As Egan observed, a violation of section 1962(c),
unlike a violation of sections 1962(a) and 1962(b),32 1 requires that the
enterprise's affairs be conducted through the underlying predicate of-
fenses.322 He expressed concern that, contrary to the apparent sense of
section 1962(c), civil claims based on that subsection "are being filed
where the alleged acts of racketeering are merely incidental to the enter-
prise. ' 323 Consequently, he recommended that section 1962(c) be
amended to read:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to "manage" or know-
ingly participate, directly or indirectly, in the "management"
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or collection of unlawful debt.324
As Egan explained, the provision would not immunize non-managerial
persons from RICO liability: "If the nonmanagerial person knowingly
participates in the racketeering activities which are the means by which
the enterprise is being managed, he would be liable." 325 At the same
time, the change would narrow the focus of RICO on enterprise crime by
removing unauthorized actions of low level employees from its scope.
Indeed, one of the principle sources of perceived abuse of section
1964(c) is the vicarious liability of the employer under RICO's treble
damages provision for the unauthorized acts of an employee.326 In
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,327 a
treble damages action under the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court fol-
lowed the "general rule" in holding that an employer is liable for the acts
of an employee where the employee acts with "apparent authority,"
though the acts complained of were unauthorized and performed solely
to benefit the employee himself.328 This rule has not been universally
320. D. Egan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 102, at 17-18.
321. See infra Appendix A for complete text of § 1962(a)-(b).
322. D. Egan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 102, at 17-18.
323. Id. at 18.
324. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
325. Id.
326. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 342. Cases holding for such liability
include: Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton, 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1984); Bernstein v. IDT Corp.,
582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581
(N.D. Cal. 1984); Harper v. New Japan See. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
327. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
328. Id. at 577.
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applied in 1964(c) cases, and the ABA Task Force expressed the view
that "the key issue of derivative liability should not be left to haphazard
judicial development." '329 The Task Force further stated that:
[T]reble damages under Civil RICO should not be triggered
pursuant to the same federal civil respondeat superior test. The
Task Force does not believe, for example, that a brokerage firm
should have treble damage Civil RICO liability for the pattern
of racketeering activity of low level agents or employees in
cases where there is no direct criminal involvement of either
high-level managerial agents or top officers or directors and
where there has been no conscious avoidance or wilfull blind-
ness of offending activities by such high-level officials or mana-
gerial agents. Indeed, these are the very circumstances where
the corporate entity, while probably having single damage re-
spondeat superior liability under the federal securities laws to
the victims of the predicate offenses committed by its low-level
employees or agents, should, as a RICO victim, have standing
to pursue a treble damage private Civil RICO cause of action
against its errant low-level employees and agents.330
Accordingly, the ABA Task Force recommended that section
1964(c) be amended to include a provision similar to section 2.07(l)(c)(3)
of the Model Penal Code, which limits the criminal liability of corpora-
tions and unincorporated associations for the unauthorized conduct of
employees to situations where "the commission of the offense was au-
thorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of
the corporation within the scope of his office or employment. '331
The ABA Task Force recommended, however, that "recklessly tol-
erated" be changed to "knowingly tolerated. '332 As the Task Force ex-
plained it:
[T]he trend in modern federal criminal law decisions has been
to interpret "knowing" or "knowingly" to include reckless con-
duct only if the circumstances demonstrate "conscious avoid-
ance" or "wilful blindness" of the existence of the violative
conduct. The Task Force's preference for the word "know-
ingly" in lieu of "recklessly" is intended to embrace the con-
cepts of "conscious avoidance" and "wilful blindness."
329. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 360.
330. Id. at 360-61.
331. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1972).
332. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 362.
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However, it is intended to avoid covering borderline cases of
ordinary negligence, that might be pursued by plaintiff's pursu-
ant to the "recklessly tolerated" language.333
The ABA Task Force did not adequately explain its determination
that an appropriate standard of vicarious liability for section 1964(c) be
drawn from "modem federal criminal law decisions." Though such deci-
sions may provide the proper standard for section 1963, treble damages
and attorneys' fees alone do not convert section 1964(c)'s civil remedy
into a criminal penalty warranting the protections of the criminal law.
In fact, the standard recommended for civil liability under section
1964(c) is more stringent than that which the Model Penal Code pro-
vides for criminal liability.
The ABA Task Force found "Congressional support for limiting the
treble damage liability of corporations and other entities on a respondeat
superior or other derivative liability basis" in the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984 (ITSA). 34 Section 2 of the ITSA provides for "a civil
penalty" of up to "three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result
of... unlawful purchase or sale," to be paid into the United States
Treasury by any person or aider and abettor of any person found to have
violated its provisions. 3  Section 2 further provides in part that:
No person shall be subject to a sanction under subpara-
graph (A) of this paragraph solely because that person aided
and abetted a transaction covered by such subparagraph in a
manner other than by communicating material nonpublic infor-
mation.... No person shall be liable under this paragraph
solely by reason of employing another person who is liable
under this paragraph. 36
This provision is not a "treble damage" provision; it is a penalty provi-
sion. As such, it is more closely related to criminal sanctions than to
section 1964(c)'s civil remedy. If anything, it evinces congressional rec-
ognition of the inadequacy of merely disgorging a wrongdoer of ill-gotten
gains as a means of deterring wrongful conduct. If the ABA Task Force
is seeking an apt analogy, it is to be found in the antitrust laws.337
The ABA Task Force recognized that:
Even assuming the infiltrated business is as innocent as the vic-
333. Id.
334. Id. at 356 (citing ITSA, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u (West Supp. 1985)).
335. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
336. Id. § 78u(d)(2)(B).
337. See supra text accompanying notes 327-28.
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tim of the RICO violation, it would seem better to place the
risk of loss peculiarly attributable to the RICO violation on the
infiltrated business entity rather than the victim, for the entity
is in a position to adopt policies or practices to lessen the likeli-
hood of RICO violations, and to spread the loss incurred over a
larger group.
338
Insofar as the vicarious liability provision proposed by the ABA Task
Force as well as the "management" amendment suggested by Egan
would insulate the employer from treble damages liability, they would
virtually annihilate any incentive for such defendants actively to discour-
age employees from engaging in the conduct RICO seeks to deter. An
employer often benefits from such conduct and, in fact, facilitates it.
Since the employer is in the best position to discourage the conduct, it
ought to have a greater burden to do so than would be imposed under
these formulations.
If immunity from respondeat superior is viewed as undesirable but
treble damage strict liability imposes too severe a burden, Congress
might consider adopting into section 1964(c) a suitable modification of
the language it used in the ITSA. Such a modification of section 1964(c)
might be read as follows:
No person shall be liable under this section for more than
actual damages solely by reason of employing another person
who is liable under this section.
This provision contemplates a fault standard for treble damage liability.
It would provide adequate protection for innocent employers while im-
posing on them at the least a duty of reasonable care to protect others
from the unlawful conduct of those in their employ.
S. 1521 addresses the problem of abuse of RICO by private plaintiffs
by adding to section 1964(c) the following provision:
(3) If the court determines that a suit brought under this
subsection was frivolous and without merit, the court may, at
its discretion, award the cost of the suit including reasonable
attorney's fees to the defendant. 3 9
Although it has been suggested that there is scant empirical evi-
dence that RICO has been more abused than any other cause of ac-
tion,34" that is hardly a settled question. Certainly, to the extent that the
statute does invite abuse, a provision which would discourage such abuse
338. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 363-64.
339. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). For complete text see infra Appendix D.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
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would be welcome. The problem with the S. 1521 solution, however, is
that it adds very little to what is already there. Any suits which would be
discouraged by the unlikely imposition of sanctions contained in S. 1521
would probably be discouraged by the sanctions already imposed under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 41 Rule 11 provides for
sanctions, including costs and attorney's fees, to be awarded against a
party and attorney where the attorney files a pleading that fails to meet
the requirements that "to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose.
342
The sanctions authorized by Rule 11 already are being invoked in
instances where section 1964(c) claims were found to have been filed in
violation of Rule 11.31 It is difficult to see what, if anything, is added by
the S. 1521 amendment. As a matter of fact, its provisions are substan-
tively identical to Rule 11.
Irvin B. Nathan has proposed that Congress consider a measure that
would impose some "multiple of costs and attorneys' fees, against any
party found to have brought a meritless RICO action. '"" Unlike S.
1521, such a provision would exceed the sanctions now provided for in
341. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
342. Id.
343. See, eg., Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 86
(1985). Egan suggested that the proposed provision might, in fact, have an effect opposite to
that which it is designed to achieve: "The proposed provision to civil RICO adds nothing that
Rule 11 does not presently provide and, indeed, because [of] its use of such ambiguous terms as
'frivolous' and 'without merit,' may allow for inroads on the very exacting standard to which
Rule I 1 presently holds attorneys." D. Egan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 102, at 25.
344. I. Nathan, Hearings on RICO, supra note 89, at 32. Nathan offered several alternative
solutions to the meritless suit problem, if indeed it is a problem. He suggested:
One approach would be to require that treble-damage actions be brought by federal
or state officials in parens patriae suits. Such parens patriae actions would permit
recovery for persons with meritorious civil claims. Inappropriate RICO claims
would be foreclosed by a screening device analogous to prosecutorial discretion.
Id. at 29-30. Under this approach, a victim's opportunity for his day in court would depend
less on whether his suit had merit than on whether it afforded the most valuable use of the
Justice Department's, or Attorney General's, already limited resources.
Nathan also suggested, in the alternative, that RICO be amended to require a preliminary
hearing in private § 1964(c) actions. As he described it:
This hearing would take place early in the proceedings, before pre-trial discovery had
been undertaken. At this hearing, a plaintiff would have to satisfy a two-prong test:
first, that there was a reasonable factual basis to believe that plaintiff would be able to
prove at trial each element of the RICO offense charged; and second, that such a
RICO violation, if proved, would be of the type that merited criminal prosecution
under Justice Department standards.
Id. at 30. The Justice Department standards, however, are designed in part to make best use of
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Rule 11. Singling RICO out for such enhanced sanctions might be an
appropriate response to a congressional finding that section 1964(c) is
indeed a particular source of meritless suits undeterred by the already
existing sanctions. In making such a determination, of course, Congress
must distinguish suits which have no merit from legitimate causes of ac-
tion arising out of circumstances which may have been unanticipated in
1970.
VI. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
As Congress considers the future of civil RICO, it should keep in
mind that only a handful of treble damage awards have been realized
under the statute.345 Before rushing to introduce changes that may effec-
tively eliminate the private attorney general concept from section
1964(c)34 6 -as, for example, prior conviction or "fraud plus" require-
ments would do 3 7-- it might be wise to wait and see whether, in the
their limited resources, and do not embody a definition of the law of RICO. See supra note 270
and accompanying text.
Arizona's little-RICO statute includes the following in its civil remedy provisions:
K. A person other than the attorney general or county attorney who files an
action under this section shall serve notice and one copy of the pleading on the attor-
ney general within thirty days after the action is fied with the superior court....
L. Except in cases filed by a county attorney, the attorney general may, upon
timely application, intervene in any civil action or proceeding brought under this
section if the attorney general certifies that in his opinion the action is of special
public importance.
M. In addition to the state's right to intervene as a party in any action under
this section, the attorney general may appear as amicus curiae in any proceeding in
which a claim under this section has been asserted.
ARiz. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (West Supp. 1985). As Twist described this measure:
In 1982 our legislature required all private RICO plaintiffs to send a copy of their
complaint to the Attorney General. It also empowered the Attorney General to in-
tervene in any RICO case or to file amicus briefs. As a result, our office has a fairly
complete file of all private civil RICO cases in Arizona. We do not have to rely on
the hyperbole of litigators to evaluate the uses made of RICO and the potential for
abuse. We have filed amicus briefs on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendants. We
have even defended (successfully) a RICO action.
S. Twist, Hearings on RICO, supra note 122, at 12-13. Some formulation of Arizona's practice
might be workable for federal RICO. It would still permit plaintiffs with legitimate claims to
prosecute their suits. At the same time, it introduces an element of "prosecutorial discretion,"
presumably without making undue demand on the Attorney General's limited resources. Ad-
ditionally, the practice would have the beneficial side-effect of providing a means of accumulat-
ing exhaustive data so that, a few more years down the road, Congress can take a good look at
how § 1964(c) is, in fact, being used without having to rely, as Twist aptly puts it, on the
hyperbole of litigators.
345. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
346. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). For a discussion of the private attorney general concept,
see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
347. For a discussion of the proposed prior conviction requirement, see supra notes 174-91
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wake of Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,34 the horrors envisioned by
RICO's critics in fact materialize.
While RICO's propensity for abuse is largely speculative, its value
in some contexts is well documented. The private civil remedy, con-
ceived as a weapon against the infiltration by organized crime into legiti-
mate businesses, appears to have emerged primarily as a weapon against
fraud committed by wholly illegitimate enterprises as well as by other-
wise legitimate ones.3 49 Though the statute has functioned in an area
different from that anticipated by its enactors, it is an area of no less
importance to the victims of fraud and to the country.
On the other hand, there are some areas of confusion that Congress
could clarify now without limiting the effectiveness of the statute where it
is effective. Most notable is the definition of "pattern." In suggesting the
direction that such a definition should take, the Sedima Court focused on
the elements of "continuity plus relationship."350  Subsequent courts
have not applied these principles uniformly.3"' Congress should take this
opportunity to formulate a definition that would confine the statute's
scope to ongoing criminal activity. A -requirement of multiple transac-
tions or events should be part of such a definition. 352 At the same time,
Congress should be especially careful of adopting judicial definitions
suited to the facts of particular cases but inappropriate to the statute as a
whole.353
Finally, Congress ought to consider the goals that are furthered by
leaving to the various courts the determination of whether vicarious lia-
bility for treble damages attaches under the statute. To provide employ-
ers some protection from vicarious treble damages liability resulting from
employee misconduct reasonably beyond the employers' control may be
justified. The goals to be achieved under the treble damages remedy,
both of deterring unlawful conduct by making it unprofitable and of pro-
viding adequate remedies to the victims of such conduct,354 seem misdi-
rected when the cost is to be borne by persons or enterprises not
reasonably responsible for the offending conduct. The key concept is re-
and accompanying text; for a discussion of "fraud plus," see supra notes 266-72 and accompa-
nying text.
348. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
349. For a discussion of the 91st Congress' original conception of RICO, see supra note 5;
for statistical analyses of civil RICO's subsequent use, see supra notes 22-28 and accompanying
text.
350. 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14; see supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 227.
352. See supra notes 229-57 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
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sponsibility, and Congress should not carry the principle of immunity
from vicarious liability so far as to eliminate an employer's incentive to
prevent employee misconduct that can be prevented. However, any
formulaton directed to limiting vicarious liability should limit liability
for treble damages only, so that the liability of the employee and em-
ployer can be determined in a single suit.
VII. CONCLUSION
Though it might be conceded that RICO's private right of action
has been something less than a lethal weapon in the war against organ-
ized crime, the measure may prove a hero in the war against fraud.
Fraud is a growing problem that is not likely to disappear by itself. Civil
RICO provides a partial solution. It would be a great mistake for Con-
gress to adopt amendments that would limit the effectiveness of the treble
damages provision where it is proving effective.
At the same time, the judicial debate over some issues that have
arisen under the statute has survived Sedima. These issues need to be
decided by the Ninety-ninth Congress. Particularly, a definition of "pat-
tern" should be formulated that will confine the statute's scope to ongo-
ing criminal activity. And innocent parties should be provided some
protection from vicarious liability for treble damages.
Although changes directed to these issues would provide but a mi-
nor answer to what many consider a major question, the benefits already
provided by the statute argue strongly against a more extensive revision
at this time. When and if abuses that are now feared become docu-
mented facts, Congress will be in a better position to address such abuses
with specific measures directed to that purpose.
Bruce Haber
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APPENDIX A
The following includes all portions of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1982), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(1), 1963, 1964(b) (West Supp.
1985), relevant to the private/civil right of action:
§ 1961. Definitions
As used in this chapter-
(1) "[r]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib-
ery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;
(B) any act which is indictable under any of the following pro-
visions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to
bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471,
472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating
to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under
section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement
from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to
extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating
to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), sections
1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating
to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction
of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to obstruction
of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to in-
terference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952
(relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relat-
ing to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating
to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2312
and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate trans-
portation of stolen property), section 2320 (relating to traffick-
ing in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections
2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sec-
tions 2421-2424 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section
186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor
organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from
union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a
case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the feloni-
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ous manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States, or
(E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act;
(2) "State" means any State of the United States, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any ter-
ritory or possession of the United States, any political
subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality
thereof;
(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity;
(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after
the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;
(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or con-
tracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of
the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or
which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or
in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to
usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the busi-
ness of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a
State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending
money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or
Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the en-
forceable rate;
§ 1962. Prohibited activities
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received
any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt
in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
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establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce. A purchase of securities on the open market for pur-
poses of investment, and without the intention of controlling or
participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another
to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the se-
curities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern
or [sic] racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful
debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do
not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activ-
ities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or as-
sociated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or par-
ticipate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to vio-
late any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this
section.
§ 1963. Criminal penalties
§ 1964. Civil remedies
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have ju-
risdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of
this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not
limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any inter-
est, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable
restrictions on the future activities or investments of any per-
son, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce;
or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
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(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings
under this section. In any action brought by the United States
under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as practica-
ble to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final de-
termination thereof, the court may at any time enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions,
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as
it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by rea-
son of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue there-
for in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the
United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United
States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from deny-
ing the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subse-
quent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
§ 1965. Venue and process
(a) Any civil action or proceeding under this chapter
against any person may be instituted in the district court of the
United States for any district in which such person resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.
(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any
district court of the United States in which it is shown that the
ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other
district be brought before the court, the court may cause such
parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be
served in any judicial district of the United States by the mar-
shal thereof.
(c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted
by the United States under this chapter in the district court of
the United States for any judicial district, subpoenas issued by
such court to compel the attendance of witnesses may be served
in any other judicial district, except that in any civil action or
proceeding no such subpoena shall be issued for service upon
any individual who resides in another district at a place more
than one hundred miles from the place at which such court is
held without approval given by a judge of such court upon a
showing of good cause.
(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under
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this chapter may be served on any person in any judicial district
in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or trans-
acts his affairs.
§ 1966. Expedition of actions
§ 1967. Evidence
§ 1968. Civil investigative demand
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APPENDIX B
H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), sponsored by Representa-
tive John C. Conyers, Jr. (Democrat, 1st dist., Mich.), reads in full:
To amend chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONAL AMENDMENTS.
Section 1961 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out "racketeering"
and inserting "predicate criminal" in lieu thereof;
(2) so that paragraph (4) reads as follows:
"(4) 'enterprise' means a business or other similar
business-like undertaking by an association of persons,
whether organized for legitimate or illegitimate purposes,
and includes a government or government agency;";
(3) so that paragraph (5) reads as follows:
"(5) 'pattern of criminal activity' means two or more
acts of predicate criminal activity, separate in time and
place-
"(A) each of which occurred not more than five
years before the indictment is found, or information is
instituted, that names such acts as predicate criminal
activity;
"(B) all of which are not violations of the same
provision of law, if that provision of law is-
"(i) the second undesignated paragraph of
section 2314 (relating to the transportation of
stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent State
tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting) of
this title;
"(ii) section 1341 (relating to mail fraud) of
this title; or
"(ii) section 1342 [sic]* (relating to wire
fraud) of this title; and
"(C) that are interrelated by a common scheme,
plan, or motive, and are not isolated events;";
(4) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (9);
(5) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph
* The correct citation for wire fraud is 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
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(10) and inserting "; and" in lieu thereof; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
"(11) 'criminal syndicate' means an enterprise of five
or more persons, a significant purpose of which is to en-
gage on a continuing basis in a pattern of criminal activity,
other than a pattern of criminal activity consisting solely
of conduct constituting a felony under section 1084 of this
title or under the law of a State relating to engaging in a
gambling business.".
SEC. 2. OFFENSE AMENDMENTS.
Section 1962 of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by inserting after the heading of such section the
following new subsection:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to or-
ganize, own, control, finance, or otherwise participate in a su-
pervisory capacity in a criminal syndicate.";
(2) by redesignating subsections (a), (b), and (c) as
subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively;
(3) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (b) by
paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" each
place it appears and inserting "criminal activity" in
lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to use or
invest";
(4) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (c) by
paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" and
inserting "criminal activity" in lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to acquire
or maintain";
(5) in the subsection redesignated as subsection (d)
by paragraph (2)-
(A) by striking out "racketeering activity" and
inserting "criminal activity" in lieu thereof; and
(B) by inserting "knowingly" before "to conduct
or participate"; and
(6) by striking out the subsection designated (d) with-
out regard to the redesignations made by paragraph (2).
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SEC. 3. SECTION 1963 AMENDMENTS.
Section 1963(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended-
(1) by striking out "any provision of section 1962 of
this chapter" and inserting "section 1962" in lieu thereof;
(2) by inserting "in the case of a violation of a subsec-
tion other than subsection (a) of such section" after
"shall" the first place it appears; and
(3) by inserting "and in the case of a violation of sub-
section (a) of such section be fined not more than $250,000
or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both," after "or
both,".
SEC. 4. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) HEADING FOR CHAPTER.-The heading of chapter 96
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out
"RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANI-
ZATIONS" and inserting "CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES
AND CORRUPTION OF ENTERPRISES" in lieu thereof.
(b) TABLE OF CHAPTERS.-The table of chapters at the
beginning of part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended
so that the item relating to chapter 96 is amended to read as
follows:
"96. Criminal enterprises and corruption of enterprises....
1961".
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APPENDIX C
H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), sponsored by Representa-
tive Fredrick C. Boucher (Democrat, 9th dist., Va.), reads in full:
To amend section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, with
respect to certain civil remedies for persons injured by racke-
teering activity.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That sec-
tion 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "a violation" and inserting "con-
duct in violation" in lieu thereof;
(2) by striking out "therefor" and inserting "any per-
son who engaged in that conduct and, with respect to such
conduct, was convicted of racketeering activity or of a vio-
lation of section 1962" in lieu thereof;
(3) by inserting a comma after "district court"; and
(4) by adding at the end the following: "A civil ac-
tion under this subsection may not be commenced against
a defendant later than one year after the entry of the latest
judgment of conviction against the defendant for racke-
teering activity or a violation of section 1962 with respect
to the conduct out of which such action arises.".
May 1986]
940 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:851
APPENDIX D
S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), sponsored by Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch (Republican, Utah), reads in full:
To clarify the intent of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act with respect to private civil actions.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That sub-
section (c) of section 1964 of title 18, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
"(c)(1) Any person suffering competitive, investment, or
other business injury as a result of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter involving a pattern of racketeering activity may sue
therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.
"(2) For purposes of this subsection, 'pattern of racketeer-
ing activity' shall require that at least one act of racketeering
activity shall be an act of racketeering activity other than-
"(i) an act indictable under section 1341 of title 18,
United States Code;
"(ii) an act indictable under section 1343 of title 18,
United States Code; or
"(iii) an act which is an offense involving fraud in the
sale of securities.
"(3) If the court determines that a suit brought under this
subsection was frivolous and without merit, the court may, at
its discretion, award the cost of the suit including reasonable
attorney's fees to the defendant.".
